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Abstract:
This thesis examines the interaction between mystical theology and social 
justice, particularly thi'ough the tropes of kenosis and aporia. I argue for a poetics of 
justice modelled on a practice of reading that incorporates both the kenotic and the 
aporetic. Contemporary literary theory provides a point of intersection for the 
disparate selection of texts analysed over the course of the essay: through the works of 
Jacques Derrida, I develop a notion of justice that requires an exegetical openness and 
interdisciplinarity that focuses on the textuality of mystics, philosophers, and 
novelists.
The first two sections provide a broad overview of the theoretical foundations 
of the thesis: Derrida’s analysis of justice as a fundamentally aporetic concept is used 
as a point of departure. Section Tlrree offers an analysis of critical terms used in the 
course of my investigation. Section Four uses the work of Michel de Certeau, Maurice 
Blanchot, Dorothee Soelle, and S.T. Coleridge in order to investigate the unique 
linguistic characteristics of mysticism and their relationship to justice. Section Five 
outlines the ontological characteristics assumed in this investigation and draws 
primarily on the thought of Jean-Luc Marion. Section Six uses Elaine Scarry’s work 
to analyse the relationship between aesthetics, mysticism, and justice. Section Seven 
investigates the works of thiee major figures of Neoplatonic and apophatic mysticism: 
Pseudo-Dionysius, the Cloud-author, and Meister Ecldiart. Section Eight develops the 
theme of reading justice as evidenced in the work of Simone Weil and J.M. Coetzee.
Mysticism vanished at its point o f origin. Its birth pledges it to the impossible, as if, 
stricken by the absolute from the veiy beginning, it finally died o f the question from which 
it was formed -  Michel de Ceiteau, The Mystic Fable (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1992): 77.
I. Introduction
Mystical theology encompasses a vast corpus of texts and writers spamiing 
both centuries and religions; tlnrough poetic and often paradoxical use of language, 
mystics attempt to make God manifest through -  and in -  the written text itself. 
Resultantly, language is pressed to its very limits in this drive to express what is 
fundamentally unsayable. In this essay, I will investigate the ways in which mystic 
writings contribute to contemporary notions of justice, particularly through a textual 
approach to kenosis and aporia.
Through the exegetical lens of postmodern theorists and critics (figures such 
as Jacques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot, Elaine Scany, and Jean-Luc Marion) whose 
works discuss topics as divergent as linguistics, theology, literary theory, aesthetics, 
and legal theory, I will explore topics suiTounding theories of justice in contemporary 
thought. From this theoretical foundation the essay will move into a detailed analysis 
of tln ee seminal thinkers of the Neoplatonic and apophatic tradition in mystical 
theology: Pseudo-Dionysius, the anonymous author of The Cloud o f Unknowing, and 
Meister Ecldiart. Following this section I will consider the themes developed earlier in 
the essay in relation to two twentieth-century figures not normally seen as part of the 
‘mystic tradition’: French philosopher and social theorist Simone Weil and South 
African novelist J.M. Coetzee. Both of these writers, however, are linked in their 
attention to the cruelties perpetrated in the name of various ideologies over the course 
of the twentieth century and the concomitant need to develop a sense of justice 
modelled on reading. That is to say, the idea of ‘reading justice’ is deployed variously 
in their works as a programme that prevents the totalising impulse of ideology from 
taking root; totalitarianism is avoided tlnough constantly and continuously refining 
the readings of justice we produce.
Consequently, it is this theory of rearimg justice that will mn thi'oughout this 
essay. My focus will be on the textuality of the writers discussed; I will concentrate 
on the ways in which reading itself functions in mysticism. Through this, I aim to 
establish a poetics of justice that centres on the necessary gaps in and incompleteness 
of our knowledge. The notion of the aporetic moment that is crucial in Derrida’s work
on justice provides a bridge between theories of language and mystical texts that 
constantly falter on the edges of discourse and understanding. Another cmcial term 
that will be present thi'oughout my argument is the concept of kenosis that stems from 
Philippians^ : God’s self-emptying gesture in the Incarnation and Crucifixion. This 
kenotic movement is echoed thi'oughout the Clii'istian mystic tradition; it is connected 
to the argument here by providing an unattainable model of both justice and selfhood. 
The texts I use in the course of my argument aim to school their audience in a kenotic 
fomi of reading; we are taught, in a sense, of our own limitations: what we do not and 
caimot know. The kenotic reading instantiated in the reader by the mystic text 
encourages, through this awareness of incompleteness, an opeimess to change and a 
constant desire to restore, renew, and readjust one’s readings.
The need for the particular interdisciplinarity of my project thus becomes 
clear. These themes and strategies are not deployed simply within clear-cut 
disciplinary -  or even chronological -  categories. Rather, the thread I wish to trace 
involves thematic components scattered across both centuries and genres. ‘Justice’ is 
a notoriously complex and polyvalent tenn; in the attempt to unfold a definition of 
justice and create a space for it to flourish, the many varying resources of our 
intellectual tradition must be employed. Any lesser effort would run the inevitable 
risk of having tremendous blind spots in its argument. If, as I intend to demonstrate, 
the truest way of speaking about justice is thi'ough a poetic framework, then I feel it 
necessary to have an openness towards texts that will allow the different voices of 
literature, philosophy, mysticism, and critical theory each to speak differently towards 
a poetics of justice.
The concept of justice as developed in Jacques Demda’s essay ‘Force of Law: 
The “Mystical Foundation of Authority’” provides a starting point for a project that 
aims to examine the mystical undei-p innings of justice and to illuminate the works of 
medieval mystics in light of contemporary theoretical notions of justice and identity. 
In a similar movement, in the course o f examining contemporary works of 
philosophy, theology, and literary theory, reference will be made to mystic texts of 
earlier periods. The interaction of mysticism and justice takes place on many levels; 
here my goal will be to provide an introductory account of the theoretical issues at
‘ Clirist, ‘existing in the form o f God, counted not the being on equality with God a thing to be grasped, 
but emptied himself, taking the form o f a servant, being made in the likeness o f men’ (Phil. 2:6-7, ASF)
stake in this project while developing the foundations of a ‘poetics of justice’ formed 
through the lens of mystical theology.
A poetics of justice -  rather than a theory of justice -  in that my approach will 
be literary rather than analytic, constructive rather than historical.^ In particular, I aim 
to recover the specifically creative properties embedded within the concept of poetics. 
Seeing poesis as an act of creation or conception leads to the essential attribute of 
creativity that seiwes to link the varying strands of discourse integi'ated within this 
essay. Insofar as God is creator, a theology of eisegesis that itself aims to create 
through poetics (specifically through the acts of reading and writing per se) seems a 
tmer approach than an exegesis that goes no further than description and analysis. At 
the same time, however, instead of proposing any set doctrine or protocol -  or solely 
outlining the meaning of these temis over the course of their historical development -  
my aim will be instead to develop ways of thinking and writing about justice and 
creating a literary space in which justice might flourish. In a sense, this approach is 
closest to the method or outlook of mystical theology itself: mystics often seem to 
belong more appropriately in the company of poets than of theologians (‘theologians’ 
naiTowly defined, that is). I aim to establish a framework within which justice might 
be allowed to appear, not to propose any rigid formulation or fixed definition of 
justice itself. To a certain degree, this restriction inheres within the very concept of 
justice as I will be using it: whereas laws must o f necessity be codified and 
implemented (in the best of circumstances with reference to a higher cause), justice 
must remain in a certain sense transcendent, fluid, and unrealised in this world 
(although only thi'ough the failings o f the world, not thimigh any incompleteness on 
behalf of justice as such) in order to be truly worthy of its name.
My approach will be both conceptual and rhetorical. While looking at the 
content of mystic texts and the themes that they develop in relation to justice, I will 
also be interested in how their rhetorical structures, the tropes and forms of language
 ^Raimond Gaita, in his fine study A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice, 
draws attention to the importance o f  this perspective and points the way to a need for a poetics o f 
justice. Although he attempts to formulate a predominantly secular approach to justice, his prime 
example o f ‘justice beyond virtue’ is the selfless love o f a nun he witnessed caring for the mentally ill 
in his native Austr alia. ‘Philosophers and theologians are, for reasons that go deep into their 
disciplines, inclined to say that the language o f  prayer and worship, anthropocentiic and often poetic, 
merely makes moving and therefore psychologically accessible to less than perfectly rational beings, 
things whose intellectual content is more clearly revealed in the absh act deliverance o f  theological and 
philosophical theories. I suspect that the contrary is closer to the truth -  that the unashamedly 
untheoretical, anthropocentiic lairguage o f worship has greater power to reveal the structure o f the 
concepts which make the nun’s behaviour and what it revealed intelligible to us’ (23).
they use (particularly their use of metaphor), may also contribute to a poetics of 
justice. The use of language and rhetoric in mystical texts that I will discuss here, 
while certainly broadly divergent, nevertheless bears certain similarities that may be 
analysed just as surely as their descriptions of the divine and their reflections on their 
own experiences may be discussed within a common inteipretive framework. I will 
treat the mystical texts discussed herein as works with both significant theological 
content and noteworthy literary and rhetorical tropes.
II. Justice and Mysticism: Introductory Themes
Jacques Derrida writes in ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority, an essay in the collection Deconstruction and the Possibility o f Justice:
‘I think there is no justice without this experience, however impossible it may be, of 
aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for 
justice whose structure wouldn’t be an experience of aporia would have no chance to 
be what it is, namely, a call for justice’ (Carlson, Cornell, and Rosenfeld, 16). He here 
establishes that -  past the law’s originary establislunent of authority before and 
beyond justice in a moment of violent foundation that must cloak itself in mystical 
teiTninology-justice bears within itself, within its call for or towards justice, a 
structure that bears remarkable similarities to the God of mystical theology, the 
experience of whom gives rise to the writings by which we know the mystics. The 
experience of or encounter with aporia is an essential -  and, initially, paradoxical -  
prerequisite for the appreciation and recognition of a stmcture of justice and the 
consequent development and implementation of justly authorized laws.
We see the establislunent of law’s authority as being the first fundamental 
aporia in the road towards justice. How does a law become authorized? By what 
process can a law be said to have ‘authority’? Who authorizes law, and where does 
that authority come from? Denida addresses this moment by asserting that the ‘very 
moment of foundation or institution . . . the operation that amounts to founding, 
inaugurating, justifying law {droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of 
a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor 
unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment 
could guarantee or contradict or invalidate’ (op. cit., 13). Through an aporetic moment 
of undecideability, without prior constraints or precedents, the law is founded. In a 
moment anterior to law, justice is as yet amorphous, unformed, undefined. The
7violence of its coming into being arises from its need to be authorized in a theoretical 
landscape from which no authorization can legitimately come. The law must invent its 
own authority tluough a call towards justice; ‘justice’ must provide the authority that 
the law could never hope to achieve on its own. It is a hesitant, murky moment; 
Derrida emphasizes its moral ambiguity and indeterminate relationship to justice, 
properly understood.
This moment of the foundation and authorization of the law, Derrida writes,
‘is what I here propose to call the mystical. Here a silence is walled up in the violent 
structure of the founding act. Walled up, walled in because silence is not exterior to 
language. It is in this sense that I would be tempted to inteipret. . . the mystical 
foundation of authority’ (op. cit., 14). In a silence defined by its lack of language (and 
thus inevitably caught up in language from the very begimiing) the law is founded 
through an authority that can only be described as mystical. The law’s creation 
seemingly ex nihilo brings with it a crisis of justification that can only be resolved 
tlirough recourse to a mystical silence, a mystical authority that comiects the fledging 
law to justice. The law must be silent about its own foundation and its tenuous link to 
justice; this silence of which Derrida is rightly suspicious bears on it the marks of a 
concealment, an erasure. Its authority has been secured thi'ough an originary violence; 
although its search for authority has come to an end, its relationship with justice is 
only beginning.
The movement between law and justice becomes clearer when Deirida brings 
deconstmction into the discussion, writing that although law is deconstmctible -  
because ‘its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded’ (op. cit., 14) -  ‘Justice in 
itself, if  such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstmctible. No more 
than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstmction is justice’ (ibid.).
Here Derrida identifies a crucial distinction: law depends on deconstmction to be just 
-  that is, it must undergo a stringent examination of its own unfoundedness and its 
own interior self-contradictions and inconstancies in order to have proper authority. 
Justice, far from being subject to the same scmtiny as law, is instead identified with 
that process -  deconstmction -  itself.
He continues, ‘deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the 
undeconstmctability of justice fiom the deconstructability of droit (authority, 
legitimacy, and so on). It is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, 
even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never does exist), there is justice’
(op. cit., 15). From an undeconstmctable (and hence transcendent, tout aw^re) justice 
must spring the legitimacy and authority that law depends upon. Through the 
experience of the impossible -  the fundamental aporia of the foundational passage 
towards justice -  law is established. In essence, the law cannot perforce be utopie, 
justice always is. ‘True’ justice, in this respect, can never fully ‘exist’ in the same way 
that law must exist. Justice can nevertheless function as a regulatory ideal, a check on 
the development of law, and a focus for the aspirations of a society; but despite all 
these derivative manifestations it can never exist fully and truly in the world. The 
fundamentally aporetic nature of justice must be acknowledged prior to the 
foundation of the law in order to ensure that law is founded on, so to speak, solid 
gi'ound (although a sturdy foundation for the law, in Derrida’s eyes, would be a 
foundation that is constantly examining and criticizing its flaws -  or even its own 
imfoundedness). Through the strain of the experience of the impossible and tlii'ough 
this consequent aporia the authority of the law is situated and focused. Law must be 
present and active of necessity -  in a word, it must be enforced', it can only justify its 
deeds, however, with a promise that is working towards a justice that will never be 
achieved -  but upon which it depends -  and that is, by definition, always beyond the 
reach of law.
The tenuous and ever-shifting -  yet absolutely necessary -  relationship 
between the law and justice is remarked upon by the unnamed magistrate who 
nan'ates South African novelist J.M. Coetzee’s work Waiting fo r  the Barbarians^ an 
account of an unnamed empire’s brutal and umiecessary campaign against 
‘barbarians’ outside an unnamed frontier post. The use of a novel in the midst of this 
analysis of Derrida’s thought provides a substantial point of comparison between 
theory and practice; the concepts developed in Derrida’s essay are both instantiated 
and interrogated by Coetzee’s text. This movement between and within gemes is a 
significant component of my project of ‘poetics’: tlirough this conceptual 
inteipenetration of texts, I expect overall to find (and produce) a generative, creative 
understanding of justice. Questioning the atrocities he sees committed by the military 
o f the Empire, he recalls his sentencing of a young man that deserted in order to flee 
to his family. “‘You think you know what is just and what is not. I understand. We all
 ^For another perspective on the confrontation o f ethical issues through a Derridean lens in South 
African fiction, see Jeremy Hall’s doctoral dissertation, Towards a Postmodern Ethics: Representation, 
Memory, Responsibility (University o f Glasgow, 1999), which includes a detailed and astute analysis o f  
André Brink’s exceptional novel A D ry White Season.
think we know.” I had no doubt, myself, then, that at each moment each one of us, 
man, woman, child, perhaps even the poor old horse turning the mill-wheel, knew 
what was just: all creatures come into the world bringing with them the memory of 
justice’ (152). Basic concepts of justice inhere in all humans, the magistrate believes; 
the clash between this inborn knowledge of justice and the unyielding presence of law 
is the root both of individual conflict and political upheaval.
The magistrate continues, ‘“[b]ut we live in a world of laws,” I said to my 
poor prisoner, “a world of the second-best. There is nothing we can do about that. We 
are fallen creatures. All we can do is uphold the laws, all of us, without allowing the 
memory of justice to fade.” . . .  I remember the uneasy shame I felt on days like that’ 
(ibid.). Linking the need for law to rep/ace justice in this world with the fall from 
Eden (metaphorical or theological), the magistrate asserts that only the memory of 
justice has a place in deciding upon lawful (rather than just) behaviour. All we can 
manage in a fallen world is a cmde imitation of an originary divine justice. This 
argument, however, after he witnesses the blatant injustice -  but lawfulness -  of the 
Empire, resurrects the uneasiness and shame that that argument left him with.
Derrida claims that justice must be soaked in and immersed in the sense of the 
impossible -  the encounter with and experience of aporia -  in order to have legitimate 
claim to its title and to provide a properly authoritative foundation of the law. Any 
claim to authority, any foundation of law as a basis for the imposition of force must 
run up against a gap, a block, an internal and inescapable paradox in order to be able 
to call authoritatively for a connection to justice. The law must undermine its own 
authority; it must question the very nature of its own foundation tluough an 
experience of internal paradox in order to have any claim to validity. Tluough this 
crucible of aporia we might see a justice that is enlightened about its own claims, 
aware of its own shortcomings and uncertainties, one that is constantly refining itself 
and readjusting, open to input from all sides. It is thi'ough an encounter with this 
justice that law must be founded. The alternative would be law authorised by a justice 
without aporia -  a justice that has not encountered and experienced the impossible -  
and which might sehf assuredly attempt to be made manifest and complete throughout 
the world, rather than being hinted and grasped at, rather than serving as an 
unachievable goal towards which we might always strive. What exactly could be 
meant by this ‘experience of the impossible’ that is crucial to true justice will be a 
central focus of the pages to come.
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The difficulties of this understanding of justice are made evident in another 
passage from Waiting fo r  the Barbarians. The magistrate, though desiring justice, is 
at the same time aware of the inevitable impossibilities it involves. After seeing a 
group of nomads savagely beaten in tbe town square, he plunges himself between the 
soldiers and the prisoners and is severely beaten. Afterwards, however, he questions 
his actions: ‘Would I have dared to face the crowd and demand justice for these 
ridiculous barbarian prisoners with their backsides in the air? Justice: once that word 
is uttered, where will it all end?’ (118). What would justice call for, if allowed fi*ee 
reign? What would justice demand, if  lived and experienced daily as a guiding 
principle, a viaticum for properly functioning human societies? He continues: ‘Easier 
to shout No! Easier to be beaten and made a martyr. Easier to lay my head on a block 
than to defend the cause of justice for the barbarians: for where can that argument 
lead but to laying down our aims and opening the gates of the town to the people 
whose land we have raped?’ (ibid.). The sort of radical transformation that a genuine 
commitment to justice would entail is beyond the magistrate; he recognizes his protest 
-  although leading to debilitating injury -  as being only a partial measure. Justice 
itself would be an impossibly complex endeavour, immeasurably injurious to the 
ruling authorities of the Empire. It would be, in a word, impossible.
The experience of the impossible -  and the experience of undecideability that 
comes with an encounter of aporia -  is at the very centre of Demda’s conception of 
justice; mysticism, we will see, must cope with (and depend upon) a similar structural 
core of impossibility (an analogy might be drawn with the ‘necessary contraries’ the 
romantic poets saw in the heart of the deepest truths -  as opposed to more 
straightforwardly contradictory or se lf cancelling movements). In that the 
incommunicable truths of a transcendent deity must be recorded, and that an 
irreducible understanding of God must be communicated tluough writing and human 
language, mysticism has a similar set of problems. In this vein, Derrida writes in the 
same essay that ‘[j justice remains, is yet, to come, a venir, it has an, it is a-venir, the 
very dimension of events irreducibly to come. It will always have it, this a-venir, and 
always has’ (Carlson, Cornell, and Rosenfeld, 27). Just as the God of mysticism is 
always sheathed in unlmowing even in His very exposition (and as in the Christian 
tradition the eschaton is ever awaited with hope, ever yet to come), so too is justice 
always in a process of becoming -  never fully presented, never fully realized or
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achieved. Justice is always yet to come; justice is never completely fulfilled in us or in 
the world. The kingdom of Justice, like the Kingdom of God, is always ever at hand.^
This, I will argue, is a central component of both mysticism and justice. It is 
this, the element of the mystical within justice, which keeps it from being subsumed 
completely into mundane law or stripped bare of its relationship to the tout autre and 
sheathed only in the exercise and control of worldly power. Justice, being always yet 
to come, always incomplete in this world, and ever still being built, prevents the 
authority of the law from establishing itself as absolute. It is the recognition that 
justice is complete and whole in its transcendence, but unfulfilled in us, that facilitates 
the authorisation of just laws. This a-venir (just like the negative, inlierent 
impossibility in the concept of utopia - indeed, in the very word itself) at the heart of 
justice keeps those that would proclaim to be building a new and perfect city of law -  
the fulfilment of justice -  from ever claiming that their work is done. Part of the 
strength of justice is that it can never be fully accomplished, never wholly realized; it 
is always a project eternally under construction. Justice must always remain a-venir.
The incompleteness of justice described above prevents the totality of one 
concept or one dominant ideology; it must be recognized that the attempt to make 
justice fully manifest in the world is at the root o f some of the greatest atrocities of 
contemporary times. A notion of justice grounded in and centred around its ultimate 
transcendence -  as in the Platonic notion of ‘forms’ only partially realised in this 
world -  can thus be only incompletely imitated in human communities. This system 
leads to the recognition that we can only ever be moving towards an ungraspable 
perfection. A formulation of justice that would mimic an Aristotelian metaphysics -  
in which the ideal form is patently not transcendent, and instead can be achieved and 
grasped in this world -  might lead, as many horrific moments in the history of 
totalitarianism have demonstrated, to an unwavering, um eflecting commitment to an 
ideology of ‘justice’ at any cost.^ A belief that the goals of a perfect society can be 
completely fulfilled leads inevitably to the attempt to accomplish those goals 
irrespective of the individual human tragedies that may arise in the process. The 
movement towards justice should instead be an ever fervent and passionate attempt to
The Greek term in Mark 1:15 to which I allude allows the description o f a state ofbotli presence and 
coming into presence; being and becoming are semantically intertwined.
 ^See Arendt, Hannah. The Origins o f  Totalitarianism. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973). This work, 
in its attempt to see totalitarianism as a novel form o f twentieth-century government beyond those 
anticipated by classical philosophy, sees a branch o f the roots o f totalitarianism in an acceptance o f an 
Aristotelian metaphysics.
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manifest justice more fully -  but with the recognition that there is ever more to come, 
that self-examination and openness to change is vital.
Even more tellingly, Denida writes: ‘the law is transcendent and theological, 
and so always to come, always promised, because it is immanent, finite and so already 
past. Every “subject” is caught up in this aporetic structure in advance’ (op. cit., 36). 
The law here is portrayed as embodying an aporia: because it is essentially present -  
‘immanent, finite’ -  it is always already passing away. In order to maintain itself, 
Deii'ida writes, it is always in need of ‘transcendental’ or ‘theological’ justification -  
contact with the eternal a-venir of justice. If it were to be simply present, immanent 
without transcendence, it could have no claim to authority; only thr ough seeking 
constant renewal in the transcendence of justice can it assert itself in the present. This 
paradox -  that the materiality of the law forces it to seek validation in the 
transcendent -  brings us directly to the intersection of mysticism and justice.
hi this discussion of the transcendence of the law, Derrida makes extended 
reference to Kafka’s brief, cryptic parable ‘Before the Law.’ Derrida claims that the 
‘being “before the law” that Kafka talks about resembles this situation, both ordinary 
and terrible, of the man who cannot manage to see or above all to touch, to catch up to 
the law’ (ibid.). This position, ‘before’ the law in the sense of both time and location, 
is the originary, foundational moment that must be investigated -  here through 
Kafka’s parable. Although the law is stable, present, and pre-eminently established in 
the story, the man who is both held fast by the law and ever outside of it, struggles in 
vain to reach the law and enter into it. The law’s fixity, in this sense, cripples it 
tluough inaccessibility as much as justice’s transcendence renders it problematic. One 
is too high, we might say, the other too low.
Den'ida continues, ‘we “touch” without touching this extraordinary paradox: 
the inaccessible transcendence of the law before which and prior to which “man” 
stands fast only appears infinitely transcendent and theological to the extent that, so 
near him, it depends only on him’ (ibid.). In this turn law, as opposed to justice, is 
‘theological’ only insofar as it cloaks its own, human foundation in a violence that has 
the appearance of transcendence. Law’s dependence on man, paradoxically, is the 
very thing that prevents our unfettered access to it. Its difficulty stems not fiom its 
distance or ‘transcendence’ but from its proximity. Den'ida concludes this assessment 
by asserting that ‘the law is transcendent, violent and non-violent, because it depends 
only on who is before it’ (ibid.). Whereas a system of ethics would ordinarily posit
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justice as existing independently from human society -  a transcendent goal -  Derrida 
here points out that the law’s dependence on human interlocutors gives it a wholly 
immanent quality.
Significantly, Michel de Certeau also uses Kafka’s parable in his introduction 
to The Mystic Fable as an analogy for his writing. Until the final moment of radiant 
transcendence that appears at the moment of the death of the aspirant to the law -  
‘until that final hour, the task of writing remains’ (1992, 3), de Certeau writes. 
Struggling with the revelation that his text will contain ‘the secret that a book, like 
ICaflca’s doorkeeper, keeps without possessing’ (op. cit., 13), he questions the possible 
pui-pose of writing a history of mysticism: ‘Why, indeed, does one write, near the 
threshold, sitting on the stool mentioned in Kafka’s story, unless it is to struggle 
against the inevitable?’ (op. cit., 3). These references to the secrets o f mysticism and 
the secrets of writing itself serve to emphasize de Certeau’s struggle with language in 
an attempt to elucidate not only the historical conditions of mysticism, but also more 
general claims on the linguistic, cultural, and theological status of the mystic.
Frank Kennode ends his work The Genesis o f Secrecy with a similar allusion. 
‘World and book, it may be, are hopelessly plural, endlessly disappointing; we stand 
alone before them, aware of their arbitrariness and impenetrability . .  . Hot for secrets, 
our only conversation may be with guardians who know less and see less than we can; 
and our sole hope and pleasure is in the perception of a momentary radiance, before 
the door of disappointment is finally shut on us’ (145). A significant common strand 
between this passage and the quotations of de Certeau given above is the 
consideration given to the doorkeeper, the incarnate entryway to the heimeneutics of 
the law or the secret. The victory of inteipretation here Kermode claims is ‘a 
momentary radiance’ : arbitrary and ultimately irrelevant, occurring at the moment of 
death or expiration -  the end of a life or of a text. The goal of heimeneutics, of 
inteipretation, can only ever be an attempt to tease apart strands of meaning in the 
‘hopelessly plural’ text. We are prevented from ever reaching the ‘centre’ and are kept 
merely at the outskirts by thuggish, chimerical doorkeepers. The reward is nothing 
more than a gleam, a momentary glimpse, before the door slams shut permanently.
A significant implication present in each mention of Kafka’s tale is that the 
doorkeeper or guardian is himself not privy to the contents of the secret kept -  that 
entry is given or denied without complete understanding of the situation at hand. And, 
of course, in the original case entry is only denied and denied repeatedly and
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meaninglessly. The only explanation given is that from ‘hall to hall there is one 
doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is 
already so terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him’ (174). From this senseless 
and unthinking deprivation, however, comes the final, ambiguous redemption: that he 
is able to glimpse towards the end of his life ‘a radiance that streams inextinguishably 
fi'om the gateway of the Law’ (ibid.). This radiance offers whatever hope there is in 
the story; it is to this Kermode turns as the only possible reward in the interpretive 
generation of meaning in texts.
Particularly crucial -  and possibly redemptive -  here, however, is the 
‘hopeless plurality’ of the text that Kennode claims to see as ‘endlessly 
disappointing. ’ 1 would venture that this claim is somewhat specious or misleading -  
this dour statement seems at odds with the general thrust of his inquiry. He must, it 
would seem, see it instead as endlessly provocative or inspiring -  or he would likely 
not go through such pains to undergo the search himself. For our part, we might 
instead recognize that this hopelessly plural ‘world and book’ spur on our 
participation in them by reminding us that they are never completely closed. Texts 
and communities are never completely and unquestionably analysed or understood; 
they are always willing to go tluough -  indeed, often times require and cry out for -  
one more round of exegetical inquiry. Although the radiance they offer may be 
momentary, it is iterable and potentially open to all.^
Also significant to this discussion is the specific contribution of mystics to a 
just involvement of the individual with the community or social context -  
undoubtedly a crucial concern for any possible analysis of mysticism’s relationship to 
justice. Although this will be explored in further detail over the course of the analysis 
of the mystic texts involved in this project, a passage fiom Hegel’s Phenomenology o f  
Spirit seems particularly apropos to serve as a theoretical foundation: he writes in 
§786 of ‘the return of consciousness into the depths of night in which ‘F = ‘F, a night 
which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside of it’ which results fiom ‘the
 ^Huston Smith’s preface to one o f the two Paulist Press editions o f Meister Eckhart’s wr itings {Meister 
Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Coinmentaries, Treatises, and Defense) closes with an evocative 
message distantly reminiscent o f  this parable as well, highlighting the mystic aspect o f the tale. After 
delineating the various tendencies in contemporary spirituality and the growing appeal o f the mysticism  
offered in Zen, Vedanta, and Sufism, he concludes: ‘[n]o task is more important for the Church that to 
let such persons know that behind its outer doors that are always open stands another that is closed -  
closed though accessible to those who knock. When it opens, only to close again immediately for this 
inner door never remains ajar, Meister Eckhart will be among those waiting to welcome those who 
enter’ (xvi).
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painful feeling of the Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is dead' (476). In this 
dark night of mere self-identification, God is dead; I would hazard that the mystic, 
filled to overflowing with the presence of God would never be content to lie sedentary 
in a solipsistic state of self-absoiption. The decent into self-identification and the 
belief that the ego is the end of one’s understanding is pictured here in despairing 
terms. The need for the tout autre transcendence of God pushes the ego by necessity 
beyond this stark and dismal equation. Mysticism invariably, by the very nature of its 
textuality, must always move beyond itself.
III. Definitions: Mysticism and History
Some preliminary definitions may be appropriate at this stage, particularly 
regarding how I intend to use the term mysticism over the course of this essay.
Richard King provides a useful genealogy of the term in Orientalism and Religion, 
asserting that ‘the modern academic study of mysticism began in earnest towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. The term “mysticism” derives from the same time 
period’ (7). Although the idea of the mystical certainly boasts a longer lineage than 
this,^ the idea of ‘Cluistian mysticism’ is a relatively recent one; any attempt to create 
a ‘mystic canon’ or the like is necessarily a retrospective and fairly contemporary 
project. Thus in using this term we must be certain to acknowledge its historicity, 
even as we attempt to make it relevant to texts spanning many centuries.
In general when talking about mysticism I will be referring to a set of 
theological writings that draw on a direct revelation of divine truth or a consciousness 
of divine presence for their authority and inspiration. My argument will focus on the 
apophatic and Neoplatonic tradition: writers such as Pseudo-Dionysius, the Cloud- 
author, and Meister Eckliart. Figures not traditionally considered mystics, but who use
 ^The concept o f  the ‘mystic’ can trace its origin in the terminology o f  Greek mystery cults in vogue at 
roughly the same time as the emergence o f Cluistianity. In this context it refers to the mysteries or 
secret practices o f  each particular cult (the Greek root meaning ‘to shut’ -  presumably one’s eyes or 
mouth); the ‘mystes’ were those initiated into the group and were vowed to silence or secrecy 
regarding the central rites o f the cult. See Amy Hollywood’s Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual 
Difference, and the Demands ofH isto jy  (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 2002), 146-8. 
Richard King in Orientalism and Religion also draws attention to the tripartite role o f mysticism in the 
early CMstian church: a biblical sense relating to ‘the idea o f  a mystical hermeneutic o f  scripture -  that 
is, an understanding o f the biblical message rooted in allegorical interpretation,’ a liturgical sense that 
focuses on ‘the liturgical mystery o f  the Eucharist -  the timeless communion with the divine,’ and 
finally mysticism as a spiritual or contemplative phenomenon centred around ‘a contemplative or 
experiential knowledge o f  God’ (15). These tluee interpenetrating uses o f the term w ill find resonance 
tlrroughout the mystical tradition, particularly in late antiquity and the medieval period, and it is 
important to take notice o f their myriad points o f  contact.
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language and tropes reminiscent of and related to some mystical texts, such as 
novelist J.M. Coetzee, philosopher Simone Weil, and poet Edmond Jabès, will also 
have a place in this project. Both the cataphatic and apophatic paths, however, are 
typified by an intense questioning of their own authority: they contain a constant 
search for legitimacy coupled with an understanding that language can never 
adequately describe a transcendent God.
In the attempt to remedy this inevitable flaw, mystics turn to extraordinary 
rhetorical and poetic variations in language -  in particular a rich and allusive use of 
metaphor. It is these instances of language that I will be analysing in the course of this 
study o f ‘mysticism’. Metaphor provides, in essence, an opemiess in language: it is 
language that is corrective and language that can be corrected, endlessly variable and 
endlessly being adjusted. To put it another way, it is a form of language that strives to 
make manifest an intangible referent, yet is ever aware that it can function ‘only’ as 
metaphor. Nothing is absolute in metaphor, but the goal is always to bring into being 
a -  non-realisable -  absolute. It is a language which is constantly under negotiation, 
constantly being interpreted and reinterpreted. In metaphor, the referent is both 
already present and always just arriving.
In this framework, the logic of a project involving both postmodern theory and 
medieval mysticism becomes clear. If postmodernism can be considered, to a degree, 
an attack on the Enlightenment privileging of the individual subject, then mystical 
theology offers a glimpse at a pre-Enlightenment way of viewing theology before the 
privatisation of the mystic. We are given access not to an irrational or non-rational 
worldview, to be certain, but undoubtedly one which rejects many of the totalities of 
Enlightenment thought. Medieval mysticism allows an understanding of theology not 
centred on statements of individual belief, but rather proposes a participatory and 
community-oriented theology centred on interpretation and exegesis of the 
complexities of mystic language. Postmodernism and mysticism are allies, then, in 
seeking cracks and discontinuities in the once-stable façade of language and 
metaphysics and in the Enlightemnent privileging of the rational and independent 
subject -  this attention to fractures is, ironically, the continuity and link between these 
discourses that I will bring to bear in the course of this essay, ^
® Amy Hollywood, for instance, in her study Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the 
Demands o f  Histoiy, tr aces the influence o f female affective mystics on twentieth-century intellectual 
figures such as Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, and Luce Irigaray. This recent work demonstrates, in
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I will also follow the premise developed in Don Ciipitt’s Mysticism After 
Modernity that mystical works are principally bodies of texts rather than simply a 
report of experiences.^ To put it another way, the central thrust of this analysis will 
assume that mysticism is a textual rather than experiential phenomenon. If a mystic is 
going to have legitimacy or influence on a religious or exegetical community -  as all 
mystics whose texts remain to us inevitably must, at least to some degree -  their 
writings and not their experiences are the critical component of their influence (and 
the inevitable basis for scholarship on mysticism). A ‘mystical experience’ -  although 
certainly meaningful, and just as certainly the driving force behind many mystical 
texts -  is in and of itself unverifiable and of no practical use to the theologian or the 
historian. It is the texts left behind by mystics that then enter into a discourse, 
theological or historical, and allow us to enter into discussion with their thoughts.
Mark McIntosh provides a succinct summary of this relationship between text 
and experience: ‘whether mystical texts are abstract in tone or more experiential in 
imagery, their intentionality as mystical texts is towards the hidden reality of God’s 
encounter with humanity. The movement of interpretation, therefore, is not backwards 
towards a putative experience behind the text, but forwards into reflection on the 
stmcture of that new world of divine-human encounter that is being opened up 
between the text and the reader’ (142). McIntosh argues here against an attempt to 
decipher whatever ‘experience’ of the divine the mystic might lay claim to; rather, he 
asserts that it is the henneneutical relationship of the text to a community o f readers, 
exegetes, and believers that gives a significance to a study of mysticism. This notion 
that the interpretive thmst must be towards the reworking of the world on the basis of 
the text’s report of divine-human interaction is central to my analysis; it is the 
movement of interpretation that I will employ in the pages to come.
Particularly useful in Richard King’s analysis of the genealogy of mysticism is 
his account of the privatisation and marginalisation of religion after the
part, the significant amount o f work to be done on this connection between the medieval (and, in 
particular, mystical) and the postmodern.
 ^Although I by no means support what I see as a theorisation o f mysticism opposed to the ultimate 
transcendence o f God, I nevertheless have sympathy for Cupitt’s attempt to emphasise the specifically 
linguistic aspects o f mysticism, particularly as a springboard for academic study (if not for worship or 
belief). Cupitt articulates what he considers a ‘third view ’ o f  mysticism beyond materialism and 
idealism: ‘why not start from the movement o f language, picturing it as moving along the frontier 
between the mind and the world? Then we can treat the material world as a construct on the outer 
surface o f language, and the world o f mind as a construct on the inner surface o f language. Surely that 
will lead to a better and more complete picture than is given by either idealism or materialism?’ (7).
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Enlightenment: he claims that ‘the “religious” and the “political” are not separate 
realms in reality. The separation of the two is an Enlightenment assumption that I do 
not accept’ (14). Especially relevant here is his assertion that ‘the privatization of 
mysticism -  that is, the increasing tendency to locate the mystical in the psychological 
realm of personal experiences -  serves to exclude it fiom political issues such as 
social justice’ (21). Clearly, this privatisation of mysticism will not have a place 
within the context of this essay; instead, I will seek to demonstrate the ways in which 
mystic texts, through various interpretive channels, encourage an even greater 
participation in the world and an even stronger dedication towards social justice. In 
the myriad texts in the mystic tradition, both apophatic and cataphatic, one finds that 
the predominant desire of the mystic is to communicate the central themes and 
concepts of his or her work to as wide an audience as possible; the text is written to be 
transmitted, to provide counsel or solace to as many as can read or hear it be read. Not 
only the content of the text, but its own textuality encourages this: a continuous 
textual tradition requires scribes or, later, printers, willing to further the text’s 
transmission, a heimeneutic community to receive and analyse or apply the concepts 
of the text, and a participatory involvement of a faith community in the text. 
Furthennore, many mystics chose to write in their vernacular during periods when 
Latin was the dominant and established language of theological discourse; this act 
itself shows a desire for a communal participation in the mystic text.
Mark McIntosh points to mysticism as a contemporary intersection between 
spirituality and theology. The essential dilemma for religious belief in postmodern 
times, he asserts, is that ‘theology without spirituality becomes ever more 
methodologically refined but unable to know or speak of the very mysteries at the 
heart of Christianity, and spirituality without theology becomes rootless, easily 
hijacked by individualistic consumerism’ (10). Theology in its most reified fonn, 
McIntosh argues, loses touch with the essential mysteries upon which Chi’istianity is 
based; its attempt to categorise and analyse leads to an over-secure self-satisfaction 
that is odds with the ultimate mystery and unknowability of God. Spirituality, on the
In using the Xcxm spirituality here, I defer to Philip Sheldrake’s comprehensive and well-researched 
account of the word’s meaning in the history o f Christian thought, found in Spirituality and Histoiy: 
Questions o f  Interpretation and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1992): 32-56. Suffice it to say here that 
although there is a significant breach between the term’s earlier uses and those o f  the past tln-ee 
decades, the unifying tlnead is a focus on the importance o f  the individual experience or awareness o f  
the transcendent (originally in the Chr istian context, in the form of the Spirit) and on the relationship o f  
theology to the practice o f everyday life.
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other hand, notoriously offers quick solutions to postmodern problems without 
commitment, stability, or continuity. The implication is clear: that contemporary 
society has divorced theology from spirituality (most often in favour of the latter); 
McIntosh sees in the Christian mystical tradition a corpus of texts that could 
rehabilitate this present-day gap. Mystical theology adds a depth and a history to what 
could otheiwise become gioundless, uncommitted spirituality. By the same token, 
mysticism calls theology to task and prevents it from becoming disconnected from the 
mystery inherent at the centre of a belief in an unknowable and transcendent God.
Usefully in this context, he reports that ‘spirituality calls theology to an 
honesty about the difficulty of understanding what is unfathomable . . .  an openness to 
what is never a puzzle to be solved but always a mystery to be lived’ (15). In this 
dichotomy, spirituality prevents reified theology’s claim to knowledge from being 
absolute, keeping it from overlooking the unknowable tout autre that is God. This 
resonates strongly with the discussion ofD enida above: mystical theology does not 
seek to iron out all the kinks in knowledge, but instead allows those flaws to resonate 
within a self-referential language that is always aware of how it must falter and fail 
the nearer it comes to reaching God. McIntosh’s description of mystical theology is 
acutely aware of the necessity of this ‘opemiess to . . .  a mystery to be lived’.
In his work Love, Power and Justice, Paul Tillich explores a justice beyond 
‘tributive^^ justice’ or ‘proportional justice’ (which is concerned with an equitable 
distribution of goods and resources). He terms this elevated concept ‘transforming’ or 
‘creative’ justice. Of this he writes, ‘it is based on the fact to which I have already 
referred that the intrinsic justice is dynamic. As such it cannot be defined in definite 
terms, and therefore the tributive justice is never adequate to it because it calculates in 
fixed proportions’ (64). That is, justice concerned solely with doling out appropriate 
quantities of tribute can only ever remain a static force. Justice calls for something 
more active and dynamic, because ‘one never knows a priori what the outcome of an 
encounter of power with power will be. If one judges such an encounter and its 
outcome according to previous power proportions, one is necessarily unjust, even if 
one is legally right’ (64-5). The necessary indeterminacy of power relations in every 
moment prior to their actualisation requires a justice dynamic and creative enough to 
confomi to ever-changing situations. The meaning and implementation of justice is
Tillich coins this neologism to describe the amalgam o f distributive and retiibutive justice.
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always relational and fluid, always being negotiated in response to the varying 
particulars of the world. Along these lines Derrida adroitly points out that ‘there is an 
avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is 
possible which, as an event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations, and 
so forth’ (Carlson, Cornell, and Rosenfeld, 27). Justice is necessarily that which does 
not, cannot take everything into accoimt or assume to understand precisely, in 
advance, the outcome of variegated power relations. Instead, justice demands an 
avenir, a sense that history has not yet been worked out and that there are events, 
outcomes, and power relations that are unpredictably still to come.
IV. Language and Mysticism: Metaphor and Paradox
The language of mysticism is perhaps its most intriguing feature: mystics are 
constantly using variations in language to press their observations towards a linguistic 
breaking point. Mystic language is always aware of its own inadequacies; it 
constantly stmggles with paradoxical and unstable ways to express the inexpressible. 
One particular astute work on this topic is Michel de Certeau’s The Mystic Fable, 
which places significant emphasis on the rhetorical changes heralded in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century mysticism; his work evokes the structural and linguistic shifts 
that take place in works of mystical theology. For all the earlier discussion in this 
essay of words about mysticism, about the definition o f  mysticism, it is now 
important to look at broad theoretical issues surrounding the language of mysticism 
per se. We must examine the various facets of its particular linguistic quirks and 
idiosyncrasies in order to see how these might eventually contribute to our 
understanding of mysticism and justice.
In a discussion of Saint John of the Cross, de Certeau remarks of the use of 
oxymoron -  by bringing together opposites, this trope ‘is a deictic: it shows what it 
does not say. The combination of the two terms is substituted for the existence of a 
third, which is posited as absent. It makes a hole in language’ (1992, 143). This 
particular brand of mystic speech punctures language; it makes us aware that a 
paradoxical combination of two terms meant to bring about the presence of a third 
allows for a speech riddled with contradictions, filled with difficulties to be pieced 
together and repaired. He continues, ‘It roughs out a space for the unsayable. It is 
language directed toward non-language . . .  In a world taken to be entirely written and 
spoken, therefore “lexicalizable,” it opens up an absence of correspondence between
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things and words’ (ibid.). A world that once made sense, a world in which words and 
things once neatly slotted together, is tom apart by the mystic utterance; mystic 
speech presses foi*ward and allows concepts to be developed for which corresponding 
words do not yet exist. The link to the description of metaphor in the pages above is 
clear: this use of oxymoron in the work of Saint Jolm of the Cross that de Certeau 
analyses points towards ‘the unsayable,’ towards that which cannot be fully 
articulated yet exists -  and is striven towards -  all the same. It is perhaps through the 
aporetic articulation of this unsayable locution that a sense of being can be developed 
in a space unconstricted by verbal or cultural definitions; ‘Being’ in a Heideggerian 
sense could then unfold without qualification.
De Certeau sees ‘the wounded word as the standard unit of mystic speech’ in 
that ‘an original split makes the “ontological” statement, which would be the “said” of 
the intended thing, impossible’ (op. cit., 144). The essential element of mystic speech 
described here is ‘the wounded word,’ the word that bears within itself the fatal 
wound of its own impossibility. It is the Saussurean signifier without ontological 
rooting in a signified -  or rather, it is ontologically rooted, but only ever in the 
transcendent, indescribable, unreachable divinity. Mystic speech produces an inner 
referentiality that gives it a textual self-rootedness. There is a dual motion of the 
mystic word: inward and outward. Outward towards an unreachable divinity, as 
mentioned above, but inward towards the referent that it produces within itself, the 
referent which inheres within the language of the text as such. The mystic makes 
possible and realised that to which access ought to be impossible -  God made 
manifest within the very text that sought merely to describe Him. This is the tear, the 
splice, and the self-inflicted wound of mystic speech. It is as impossible as speaking 
about justice.
Language is stretched to its breaking point in an attempt to reach beyond itself, 
beyond self-referentiality. ‘The mystic phi'ase escapes that logic [of the ontological 
statement] and replaces it with the necessity of producing nothing more in language 
than effects relative to what is not in language. What must be said cannot be said 
except by a shattering of the word. An internal split makes words admit or confess to 
the mourning that separates them firom what they show’ (ibid.). Mystic speech here, 
rather than pointing within itself, can only point outside of language and outside of 
discourse; all this understandably, de Certeau explains, cannot take place without ‘a 
shattering of the word.’ This wounding and shattering of language within mysticism.
22
this endless yearning for a referent that can only transcend language’s attempt to 
encapsulate it, results in the language’s mourning its own failure to signify.
De Certeau’s closing remarks on mystical language come after a discussion of 
a twentieth-century writer, Catherine Pozzi, in ‘Overture to a Poetics of the Body,’ the 
closing chapter of The Mystic Fable. ‘Echoes of Cluistine Pozzi’s poems can be heard 
in the most varied historical settings. A thousand-year-old tradition, that mystic 
poetics passes from place to place and age to age’ (op. cit., 298). He writes that this 
voice is ‘a game of surprises, driftings, fugues in all directions, but also the meeting 
place where “I” returns to lose itself in that crowd that is, with neither name nor face, 
the presence of “you”’ (ibid.). This movement of the self into otherness is a critical 
component of his understanding of the mystical; the dissolution of selfhood is a 
cmcial facet of many mystical texts. This movement will be explored later in gi'eater 
depth, particularly regarding its possible contribution to the poetics of justice outlined 
above.
De Certeau closes with a deployment of the mystic as pilgiim; he writes on the 
sense of geographic displacement heralded by the mystic text. ‘He or she is mystic 
who cannot stop walking and, with the certainty of what is lacking, knows of every 
place and object that it is not that\ one cannot stay there nor be content with that. 
Desire creates an excess. Places are exceeded, passed, lost behind it. It makes one go 
further, elsewhere. It lives nowhere’ (op. cit., 299). Mystics are here described as 
eternal vagabonds: desirous of truth, ever unsatisfied and discontented by present 
conditions, always moving towards the Good without ever reaching it. Mysticism is 
an exercise in necessary impossibility. De Certeau’s claim here resonates with the 
earlier introductory discussion of mysticism: the mystic must continually be moving, 
readjusting, improving, and negotiating. Mysticism as fonnulated here teaches us to 
be discontent with ‘every place and object’ and to recognise the present world as 
insufficient, as transitory. We must learn to see in the given world and text a lack in 
order that we might be constantly yearning and striving ‘for a further union, a deeper 
communion,’ as T.S. Eliot writes in ‘East Coker.’ Always a dissatisfaction for the 
present deployment of justice, always a yearning towards and a dedication to a more 
just future.
Maurice Blanchot’s text The Work o f Fire offers a similar attention to the role 
of language in poetry: ‘we feel and sometimes regret that poetry, far from reconciling 
the elements of language, puts infinity between them, to the point where we have to
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believe that the words it uses have no meaning whatsoever, and the meaning it aims 
for remains beyond all words’ (53). This type of writing, Blanchot implies, engenders 
in us a reaction that points not only beyond the words used, but also beyond any 
potential system of signification. Poetic language here is that which, by putting 
infinity between the signifier and signified, opens up a realm of endless interpretation 
and negotiation. ‘Poetry, by the tearing apart it produces, by the unbearable tension it 
engenders, can only want the ruin of language; but this ruin is the only chance it has 
to be fulfilled, to become whole in broad daylight’ (ibid.). Again we see the language 
of wounding and tearing used earlier in de Certeau’s discussion of mystic speech; 
similarly, just as in de Certeau, this self-destruction of language is paradoxically its 
only possible salvation or fulfilment.
In another essay in the same volume, Blanchot writes: ‘[tjhat which is 
[language’s] power of representation and signification creates a distance, an 
emptiness, between things and their name, and prepares the absence in which the 
creation takes shape. Naturally, the single word is nothing but the beginning of a shift, 
since, by its meaning, it makes present anew the signified object whose material 
reality it had removed’ (64). Here we see a further development in his formulation of 
the emptiness of language: this very self-emptying or kenosis is a linguistic 
prerequisite for the creation of meaning. Similarly, he writes that words, regarding 
their referents, ‘show it to us and yet they have disappeared; they no longer exist, but 
they always exist behind the thing that they make us see, and that is not the thing in 
itself but only the thing arising from words’ (49). This evocative account of the 
process of linguistic description lends itself neatly to the discussion of metaphor 
begun in the previous section. Words work to evoke images of their referents even as 
they are subsumed by those very images; at the same time, Blanchot acknowledges 
the contingency of what language produces. We are not given the ‘thing itself in any 
pure state; rather, we are presented only with a linguistic creation, a simulacmm.
In his The Statesman's Manual, Samuel Taylor Coleridge provides a 
provocative account of the use of symbolic language in the scripture, writing that 
language’s products ‘are the living educts of the Imagination’ which give birth ‘to a 
system of symbols, hannonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of 
which they are the conductors'' (29). That is to say, through the creative process 
language itself is able to draw out a semiotic system which becomes of one substance 
with the truth that they both produce and contain. The result, he writes, is that ‘the
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tmths and the symbols that represent them move in conjunction and form the living 
chariot that bears up (for us) the tluone of the Divine Humanity’ (ibid.). Language, 
Coleridge here conveys, is the medium tlu'ough which a sense of Neoplatonic ascent 
towards the divinity can be realised. The structures of language which mankind 
inhabits yield a system that is consubstantial with the tmths of a society. A symbol, 
he asserts, is ‘the translucence of the Eternal thiough and in the Temporal. It always 
partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, 
abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative’ (30). In 
other words, the symbolic language of theology per se must, to be considered fully 
consummated, participate in and partake of the divine in order to communicate 
properly its concepts. In this sense, then, is the language of the mystics both 
consubstantial with and procreative of its referent.
This paradoxical movement of language, both kenotic and procreative, is 
further developed through Hegel’s concept of ‘picture-thought’ -  A.V. Miller’s 
translation of the German Vorstellung, a term that can have meanings as various as 
imagination, vision, idea, or perception. In this ‘pictiue-thinking’ comes ‘the self- 
abasement of the divine Being who renounces his abstract and non-actual nature’
(470) or, as the J.N. Findlay’s analysis succinctly puts it, ‘God as a picture must die so 
that God as a thought may live’ (589). This transfomiation in thought about God in 
the Phenomenology o f Spirit heralds a reconsideration of the language of theology as 
necessarily both kenotic (and perhaps even self-deprecating or self-cancelling) and 
procreative or generative; to follow this thiough to its end, the language of theology 
and mysticism can claim to be generative precisely because it is kenotic.
Dorothee Soelle’s The Silent Cry: Mysticism and Resistance also contains a 
useful account of the nature of mystic speech. She refers to ‘frequent repetition, use of 
the comparison, hyperbole, negation, antithesis, and paradox’ (64) as being key 
features of the language of mystical theology. She quotes a passage of Mechtild von 
Magdeburg’s The Flowing Light o f the Godhead as an example, then provides this 
astute analysis. ‘This cataract o f words breaks loose without ifs or huts, without whys 
or wherefores, a cascade of metaphors that accelerates in speed and in the passion of
It is in this sense, for instance, that Shelley’s famous assertion in the ‘Defense o f  Poetry’ rings true. 
Tlu-ough their wiitings, poets serve as the unacknowledged legislators o f the language a society uses. 
Their creative processes define and adapt the uses and limits o f the language in which a society thinks, 
moves, and manifests itself. Tlnough the mediation o f  this linguistically procreative act, poets in turn 
legislate, albeit obliquely, a society’s horizons o f understanding -  in effect, its world.
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speech. The repetitious constructions . .  . rush onward with their paradoxical 
accentuations . . .  It is a language of daring passion that has left behind the terms of 
time and space, reason and purpose, power and impotence’ (65). Mechtild’s language 
is described as pushing language to its very limits; this linguistic experimentation 
reveals the constant attempt, ever impossible yet ever attempted, to make God present 
in the text itself. This self-abandoning language exceeds its constraints; its use of 
metaphor, Soelle remarks, leaves behind or exceeds standard metaphysical categories.
Finally, commenting on the apophatic mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius, Soelle 
points out the use of negation in mystical speech. His language ‘leads into an abstract 
negation that denies the possibility of conceptual knowledge. This unknowing does 
not arise from ignorance; it comes to be after knowledge. It creates an unusual 
dynamic that forever seeks new concepts, words, and images and then discards them 
as inadequate’ (67). Just as metaphor points us towards the inadequacy of language 
and forces us to re-evaluate and renegotiate terminology and concepts, so too does 
negation push aside language’s claims to certitude, forcing us to realize the 
contingency -  and, ultimately, inadequacy-of concepts, words, and images. More 
importantly, it also forces us to seek continuously for better or more accurate 
terminology and reminds us that our theological work is never finished. Tillich 
succinctly points to this necessary impossibility when he writes that ‘to say anything 
about God in the literal sense of the words used means to say something false about 
Him’ (109).
V. Ontology and Mysticism: God Without Being
In this section I briefly outline the ontological background that will be 
assumed in the course of this essay. In particular, I follow Jean-Luc Marion’s analysis 
of ontology and theology as exposited in his work God Without Being. His description 
of a non- or supra- metaphysical deity freed from human boundaries and the 
categories of ontology resonates particularly strongly with the apophatic mystic 
tradition and will occupy a principal theoretical role in the foundation of this work. In 
this regard, this section’s title is perhaps a bit misleading -  although I wish to outline 
roughly the ontological and theological framework within which I operate, at the 
same time Marion’s work calls for a God which ultimately transcends all categories of 
metaphysics. For lack of a better alternative to ‘ontology,’ however, I will let it stand 
and proceed into an analysis of Marion’s thought and its relevance to this project. It is
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helpful in this regard to repeat the words of Pseudo-Dionysius in dealing with this 
problem in The Divine Names: ‘[God] is not a facet of being. Rather, being is a facet 
of him’ (101). Failing to recognize this properly and fully is a constant and 
particularly insidious danger, particularly in works of philosophical theology. Marion 
discusses the practical implications of this metaphysical stance in Prolegomena to 
Charity, thi'ough the Ascension and its redefinition of ‘presence’ he makes a claim for 
the ontological status of the Eucharist and the body of the Church.
Marion’s first step in God Without Being is to distinguish between mamnade 
concepts of God -  which he terms ‘idols’ -  and the genuine iiTuption of God into the 
world -  the icon. The idol, according to Marion, is caused by mankind’s attempt to 
seek out and define God. As a result, he writes, the idol ‘acts as a mirror, not as a 
portrait: a mirror that reflects the gaze’s image, or more exactly, the image of its aim 
and of the scope of that aim. The idol, as a function of the gaze, reflects that gaze’s 
scope’ (1995, 12). The human gaze, directed heavenward, can only ever receive in 
return a reflection of its own intention, its own predisposition. As the human gaze 
attempts to see God, it encounters only an invisible mirror that reflects back not God, 
but an idol.
In a similar vein, Marion criticises what he terms the ‘God of the 
philosophers.’ ‘When a philosophical thought expresses a concept of what it then 
names “God,” this concept functions exactly as an idol’ (op. cit., 16). He is wary of 
attempts to develop God through the lenses of moral philosophy or ethical theology; 
he sees in ‘conceptual idolatry’ an even more pressing -  because more subtle -  thi*eat 
to the concept of a God that would transcend all human categories, including that of 
‘being.’ He responds to -  and condemns -  theological ‘proofs’ of God’s existence. 
‘Proof uses positively what conceptual atheism uses negatively: in both cases, 
equivalence to a concept transfoims God into “God,” into one of the infinitely 
repeatable “so-called gods.” In both cases, human discourse determines God’ (op. cit., 
33). Even attempts to prove the existence of God, in this light, fall into the category of 
conceptual idolatry.
Marion develops the concept of the icon in opposition to the idol: the icon 
‘does not result from a vision but provokes one’ (op. cit., 17), he writes. ‘Far from the 
visible advancing in search of the invisible’ -  the movement of the icon, in which 
humans (‘the visible’) direct their gaze in search of God (‘the invisible’) -  ‘one would 
say rather that the invisible proceeds up into the visible, precisely because the visible
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would proceed fiom the invisible’ (ibid.). The movement is a reversal of the direction 
of the idol -  in the icon the invisible moves towards the visible. The action is of God’s 
self-revelation rather than of His ‘discovery’ -  or worse, his invention. Marion’s 
description of the role of the gaze in this process is also significant. ‘The gaze can 
never rest or settle if it looks at an icon; it always must rebound upon the visible, in 
order to go back in it up the infinite stream of the invisible, hr this sense, the icon 
makes visible only by giving rise to an infinite gaze’ (op. cit., 18). Earlier in the text 
Marion mentions that one of the characteristics of the gaze’s relation to the idol is that 
the gaze is only held momentarily -  the idol interests us for a short while, after which 
restlessness or boredom sets in. hi reaction to the icon, however, the gaze is provoked; 
it becomes both restless and captivated by the presence of the infinity of the invisible.
Marion ultimately forces us to consider God in relation to the unthinkable -  
that which must inevitably always escape our powers of cognition thiough its 
transcendence. ‘The unthinkable forces us to substitute the idolatrous quotation marks 
around “God” with the very God that no mark of knowledge can demarcate; and, in 
order to say it, let us cross out with a cross, provisionally of St. Andrew, which 
demonstrates the limit of the temptation, conscious or naïve, to blaspheme the 
unthinkable in an idol’ (op. cit., 46). By ‘crossing out’ God ortho graphic ally, Marion 
seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the unthinkable might manifest itself in our 
discourse about God. Human discourse, as mentioned earlier, should not define God; 
the crossing out of God is an attempt to limit our conceptual knowledge of God, to 
make manifest and tangible the lacunæ in our knowledge of God.’^
Marion clarifies, explaining that this cross ‘does not indicate that 04^ would 
have to disappear as a concept. . . but that the unthinkable enters into the field of our 
thought only by rendering itself unthinkable there by excess, that is, by criticizing our 
thought. To cross out in fact, indicates and recalls that crosses out our 
thought because he saturates it; better, he enters into our thought only in obligating it 
to criticize itself (ibid.). Crucial in this passage is that God’s presence in our thought 
and discourse presses us to be constantly se lf critical and aware of our limitations. 
Marion’s desire to cross out God in his writing stems hom an understanding and
Compare this to Edmond Jabès’s slightly different take on the absence o f God; ‘what is death 
without the life it conditions, and vice versa? What is God without man, who limits Him by unlimiting 
himself? Man’s excess is an exemplary measuiing o f God. Hence God’s being beyond conditions 
depends on this first and ultimate evidence, the very condition o f His freedom from them: not to he' 
(191). Or, later on, the aphorism ‘God dies into God’ (193).
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appreciation of that which is unknowable at the heart of the divine. The crossing out 
of the name of God indicates to us that our thought and our language is flawed, that 
the best we can hope for in the naming of God is a mistake to be emended. It spurs us 
on to search for better names, new concepts that do not make the crucial mistake of 
idolatry. ‘We cross out the name of only in order to show ourselves that his 
unthinkableness saturates our thought -  right horn the beginning, and forever’ (op. 
cit., 46).
Responding to the likely question ‘beyond being or without being, how might 
we still be able to talk accurately about God? What words are left that don’t bear the 
mark of conceptual idolatry? What’s left to think about God now?’ Marion writes that 
the only name left unscathed by this critique is ‘a single one, no doubt, love, or as we 
would like to say, as Saint Jolm proposes -  “God [is] agapd’ (1 Jolm 4:8). Why love? 
Because this term ..  . still remains, paradoxically, unthought enough to fi-ee, some day 
at least, the thought of from the second idolatry’ (op. cit., 47). Love, then, 
becomes the name by which God can be Imown and thought of in Marion’s writings. 
Love, he maintains, is the term that allows God to remain in our field o f cognition as a 
concept without being chained to human notions of being.
The practical application of this non-metaphysical ontology of divine love 
reaches its fullest expression in Marion’s collection of essays Prolegomena to 
C h a r i t y He writes in an incisive essay on Chiistian apologetics: ‘God is approached 
only by he who jettisons all that does not befit love; God, who gives himself as Love 
only tlu'ough love, can be reached only so long as one receives him by love, and to 
receive him by love becomes possible only for he who gives himself to him. 
Surrendering oneself to love, not surrendering oneself to evidence’ (2002, 61). Here 
writing against the need to use metaphysical or ontological arguments to ‘prove’ God, 
he instead aims towards an apologetics that bears witness to God’s love. Rather than 
an ‘argumentative machine’ that would ‘force an intimate conviction by force of 
reasons’ (op. cit., 55), Christian communication to non-Chiistians and discourse 
suiTounding inter-religious dialogue should ever only point towards God’s love -  a 
communication that can take place only thi'ough love.
This remarkable collection o f essays written over decades contains some o f  Marion’s finest and most 
accessible thought; his focus on the various practical and ethical implications o f  his work is particularly 
significant.
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111 an engaging essay on the Ascension in the same collection, Marion points 
to the puzzling absence wrought by this moment in the gospels. The seeming absence 
of Cluist becomes inteipreted variously thi’oughout Christian history: as the moment 
where the Church’s work begins, for example, or the moment of a non-empirical and 
hence ‘rational, moral, or even speculative relation between men and God’ (op. cit.,
126). ‘What is paradoxically offered for meditation’ tlu'ough the Ascension, he 
writes, ‘consists not in a reduction of presence to the spirit, but in a reinforcement of 
the presence of the body and the spirit such that, in absence, both are 
incomprehensibly maintained, conserved, saved -  in a word, resunected’ (op. cit.,
127). This presence tlirough and above absence, he argues persuasively, is a crucial 
component of the mystery of Cluist. Presence is redefined tluough the Ascension, 
reworked through Cluist’s literal absence but metaphysical and real presence (tluough 
the Eucharist, for instance). The practical outcome, Marion asserts, is that ‘if the 
Ascension offers a mystery, it does so by a radical modification of presence -  by an 
effect of the Resurrection on presence in general. By a resun ection of presence’
(ibid.). In other words, presence is resurrected from a dependence on the literal 
presence of Cluist, and tluough the Ascension and the Eucharist is catapulted into 
something that is miraculously, uniquely enriched by absence.
Marion writes further that the removal of Christ from this world allows Him to 
give himself to the world more fully and profoundly; the Ascension thus ensures that 
Cluist’s gifts can be both heavenly and eternal, Marion analyses the commonplace 
that ‘if Cluist had remained physically among us, according to the worldly economy 
of presence, he would have fixed himself in a place and time’ (op. cit., 146) -  that is, 
a new form of presence is needed so that Clu ist can be universally accessible and 
relevant. This presence comes through the encounter with absence, so that ‘this 
empirical impossibility encountering him would then have merely reflected a still 
more radical impossibility of recognizing him . . . We therefore owe our seeing him to 
the gift, through the Spirit and in the Trinitarian distance of the presence o f Cluist -  in 
Spirit and in Truth, in all places and in all ages’ (ibid.). Marion redefines our 
understanding of Christ -  our seeing him despite his absence -  thi’ough the lens of the 
gift. Tluough a literal removal of Christ comes a still more meaningful presence 
(besides that of the third person of the Trinity): the distance paradoxically increases 
His closeness, the absence impossibly eiuiches His presence.
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Marion draws a startling conclusion in this analysis, joace Adventists: ‘the 
Ascension does not mark the disappearance of Cluist in the expectation of a new 
(empirical) presence at the end of an all too long absence. It marks the Paschal 
conversion of all presence into gift’ (op. cit., 151). Rather than plaiming for a returned 
Cluist in the empirical flesh, we should instead extend our notions of presence to 
include the Eucharist and the Word, Ultimately, Marion concludes, ‘if the Word 
became flesh, it is necessary, ever since the Ascension, that, in us, “flesh become 
word -  and the word fall” (Octavio Paz). Our flesh becomes word in order to bless the 
Trinitarian gift of the presence of the Word, and to accomplish our incorporation in 
Him’ (op. cit., 152). To move God beyond an ontology that demands presence means 
to offer instead a participatory ontology that, tluough the Word and the Eucharist, 
allows a motion beyond the ‘imitation of Christ’ towards incoiporation in Him.
Marion writes in ‘Evil in Person’ of the claim for justification of evil tluough 
revenge as being the chief stumbling block in a search for justice. Evil’s insidiousness 
consists in its offering itself as its own solution, that is, the thought that one can 
rectify evil or injustice against oneself by committing evil or injustice to another. ‘The 
severity of evil consists, precisely, in the way in which is imposes its logic on us as 
though it were the only logic feasible: our first effort at deliverance retains evil as its 
sole horizon’ (op. cit., 5). If the response to evil is a counter-evil, retribution in kind, 
evil continues -  indeed, it flourishes. To relive or suppress suffering by causing 
suffering on another, or to eliminate the cause of one’s own suffering outright, only 
perpetuates the logic and grammar of evil: ‘the height of evil consists in perpetuating 
evil with the intention of suppressing suffering, in rendering others guilty in order to 
guarantee one’s own innocence’ (op. cit., 8). Marion describes the attempt to use evil 
means to bring about good ends as the most pervasive and thus dangerous evil of all.'^
The solution to this desperate cycle, Marion proposes, is ‘to keep one’s 
suffering for oneself, rather than making a hypothetical culprit suffer it: to endure it, 
or as ordinary language puts it so well, to absorb the cost -  as one can absorb a 
counterfeit bill’ (op. cit., 9). The metaphor o f counterfeiting crystallises this moral 
situation perfectly: if  one receives a counterfeit bill and, deciding that the only way to 
prevent one from paying for the mse is to pass it on to an unwitting shopkeeper, it
Although I would think this would provide a springboard to a rather devastating and effective 
critique o f traditional Chiistian just war theory (shetching back to Augustine), Marion does not develop 
this theme in this essay or elsewhere in his corpus.
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remains in circulation, it remains an active force. If, instead, one cuts one’s losses and 
keeps or destroys the bill, the haiin is not passed on and the cycle is ended 
immediately. Marion sees Cluist as ultimately absorbing all the counterfeit bills (evil, 
sins) of the world: ‘the ultimate service that God can render a humanity preyed upon 
by the spirit of revenge would thus be to furnish it with an even better culprit’ (op. 
cit., 10). Thus God can absorb the evil of the world, taking it out of circulation and 
preventing it from spurring on more counter-evil.
This is, Marion asserts, only possible thiough sacrifice and death: God must be 
‘absolutely guilty, and thus, absolutely punished, and thus, absolutely dead . . . For the 
world, the only good God is a dead God . . . The world recognizes God in order to be 
able to kill him -  and God renders the world even this ultimate seiwice’ (op. cit., 10- 
11). The death of God here takes on its traditional sacrificial tones: Christ’s death 
allows the absorption of the evils of the world. Thus for Marion the crucifixion of 
Cluist, and his subsequent Ascension, mark not merely miracles concordant with the 
iiTLiption of the divine, but rather the fulfilment of Cluist’s kenosis. Thi'ough this utter 
abandonment of ‘being’ in order to close off the cycle of evil and counter-evil, 
injustice and retribution, the cmcified and ascended God both assumes and rejects all 
categories of being. Emptied of being, emptied of divinity, emptied of life itself,
Christ is able to absorb the evil of the world perfectly -  without the need for 
retribution -  and thus point the way towards a more perfect justice.
It is perhaps fitting that this section on ontology would close with a rejection 
of human categories of ontology and a recognition of God’s abandoiunent of being in 
order to preserve the possibility of justice. As stated previously, this kenotic gesture is 
cmcial both to mystical understandings of God and to the language of mysticism 
itself; I have shown its important relationship to justice and the rejection of evil 
above. Accordingly, I will use the ending o f Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Mystical 
Theology to bring this section to a close. He states that God ‘falls neither within the 
predicate of nonbeing nor being . . . There is no speaking of it, nor name nor 
knowledge of i t . . .W e make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of 
it, for it is both beyond every assertion . . . [and] free of every limitation, beyond 
every limitation; it is also beyond every denial’ (141).
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VI. Aesthetics and Mysticism: Beauty and Justice
It can be remarked that of the Platonic triumvirate the True, the Good, and the 
Beautiful, the final tenn receives relatively short shrift in contemporary discourse. 
And yet, as de Certeau points out, an understanding of beauty is absolutely central to 
an analysis of mystic discourse, for in mysticism it can commonly be found that ‘the 
criterion of the beautiful replaces that of the true . . .  It is by this metamoiphosis that a 
chart of knowledge is transformed into a garden of delights’ (1992, 58).^^ These 
categories ought to be mutually interdependent, not to say interchangeable. Why, 
then, is so much of contemporary criticism and theory hesitant to engage with the 
category of the Beautiful on equal tenns, dismissing it more often than not as an 
apolitical stumbling block on the path to Truth?
Elaine Scany seeks to rectify this misguided view in her elegant work On 
Beauty and Being Just. Beauty, she argues, far from being a flippant distraction from 
social ills, instead urges us on towards an even more rigorous appreciation of justice. 
After a broad analysis that defines beauty as sacred, unprecedented, and life-saving 
(23-5), Scarry goes on to describe beauty as inciting deliberation. ‘Something 
beautiful immediately catches attention yet prompts one to judgments that one then 
continues to scrutinize, and that one not infrequently discovers to be in error’ (29). 
Beauty is not a distraction, keeping our attention away from the truly important 
issues, rather, beauty serves to focus our attention, hone our judgments, and refine our 
thought processes. ‘Something beautiful fills the mind yet incites the search for 
something beyond itself (ibid.). This passage in particular resonates with the beauty 
to be found in mystical texts: it is a beauty that draws the reader in, perhaps 
confounding him initially, yet ultimately pointing the way towards divine truth. The 
beauty found in mystical texts always reaches beyond itself; they incite in their 
readers a movement beyond the individual and towards the -  both exegetical and 
liturgical -  community.’^
Pseudo-Dionysius is quick to point out in The Divine Names, for instance, that ‘The Beautiful is 
therefore the same as the Good’ and, earlier, ‘Beauty unites all things and is the source o f  all things’ 
(77).
Simone Weil writes about the way in which beauty is a specifically grounding force. ‘The beautiful 
takes our desire captive and empties it o f  its object, giving it an object which is present and thus 
forbidding it to fly off towards the future’ (65). Thus beauty is far from a distraction, it is rather an 
attraction towards the present moment. It focuses our concern in the present, rather than feeding a 
desire for an imagined future.
This movement as manifested in Neoplatonic mysticism will be investigated in greater detail in the 
following section.
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With particular relevance for beauty’s relationship to justice Scarry, in the 
course of explicating a passage from Augustine’s De Musica, draws the conclusion 
‘that equality is the heart of beauty, that equality is pleasure-bearing, and that (most 
important in the shift we are seeking to undertake from beauty to justice) equality is 
the morally highest and best feature of the world’ (98). The strength of beauty, then, is 
that is causes us to admire and enjoy equality per se. Rather than feeling compelled to 
forge a society in which equal opportunities are afforded to all, what might be called 
the ‘equality principle’ of beauty that Scarry puts forward means that we might 
actually find the society that most values equality also the most pleasurable and 
enjoyable. That is to say, the most beautiful society we might imagine, and thus the 
one that would give us the most pleasure and enjoyment, would be an equal one. 
Scarry is quick to respond to potential criticisms of this hypothesis, however -  the 
process, she explains, is of necessity a gradual one. ‘All that is claimed is that the 
aspiration to political, social, and economic equality has already entered the world in 
the beauty-loving treatises of the classical and Chr istian periods, as has the readiness 
to recognize it as beautiful if  and when it should aiTive in the world’ (99). In other 
words, thr ough the love of beauty inlrerent in classical and Christian thought 
(particularly as influenced by Platonism and Neoplatonism), an intrinsic appreciation 
of -  and concomitant tendency towards -  equality is established.
Another crucial aspect of Scarry’s thesis is the impact of beauty on selfhood. 
The experience of beauty, she claims, is able to both demolish and maintain the ego in 
a paradoxically simultaneous gesture. ‘Radical decentering,’ she writes, ‘might also 
be called an opinionated adjacency. A beautiful thing is not the only thing in the 
world that can make us feel adjacent; nor is it the only thing in the world that brings a 
state of acute pleasure. But it appears to be one of the few phenomena in the world 
that brings about both simultaneously: it peiTnits us to be adjacent while also 
permitting us to experience extreme pleasure’ (114). In this movement, beauty’s 
impact on the individual causes both a movement outside or beyond selfhood -  
Scarry’s ‘adjacency’ -  and an elevation of the self tlmough the extraordinary pleasure 
that beauty can grant. The self is momentarily both superseded and exalted; the 
implications of this dual movement on themes of justice will be examined more fully 
in the following section. Suffice it to say at present that this re-evaluation of selflrood 
ushers in a vision of the ego in which selflessness prevents the sort of temtorial 
squabble over identity found in so much of contemporary society. Instead, tlirough an
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experience of beauty, the self is superseded by the recognition of something far 
greater than itself. At the same time, this impression of the Beautiful affords the self 
an extraordinary pleasure that maintains the ego and protects this gesture from any 
sort of annihilatory motion.
Simone Weil writes in similar teims of the relationship between the individual 
and the Beautiful in Gravity and Grace. ‘The beautiful is a carnal attraction which 
keeps us at a distance and implies a renunciation. This includes the renuneiation of 
that which is most deep-seated, the imagination. We want to eat all the other objects 
of desire. The beautiful is that which we desire without wishing to eat it. We desire 
that it should be’ (149). Weil points to an essential aspect of the Beautiful, also 
discussed in Scany’s work: the inspiration beauty gives is not of a totalising nature, as 
in some instanees of desire. Instead, beauty pushes us towards action of a different 
nature: the guarded distance between the self and the object of beauty implies a lack 
of possession that presses the individual to an ever more refined attempt at reaching 
the transcendent (understood here as the interpenetration of the True, the Good, and 
the Beautiful). In other words, as Weil writes, beauty is ‘a fruit which we look at 
without trying to seize it’ (150). Fundamentally transcendent, beauty forces us to 
acknowledge the shortcomings in our own world and realise effective solutions to 
those shortcomings without the totalising theoretical humework predominant in 
twentieth-century attempts to build a perfect society.
The relationship between mysticism and resistance to tyranny or 
totalitarianism is explored in depth in Dorothee Soelle’s engaging work The Silent 
Cry: Mysticism and Resistance. At the end of the text, however, Soelle appends a 
commentary on her thoughts provided by a conversation with her husband in the 
course of his initial reaction to her manuscript; it is he who makes a fascinating link 
between a specifically aesthetic aspect of mysticism and resistance (one rather 
overlooked in the main body of the book itself). ‘Mysticism is the experience of the 
oneness and wholeness of life. Therefore, mysticism’s perception of life, its vision, is 
also the unrelenting perception of how fragmented life is. Suffering on account of that 
fragmentation and finding it unbearable is part of mysticism’ (302). Tlu ough a 
human, fragmented view of the wholeness and oneness of the divine, mysticism 
allows us a perception of the potential for ‘unity in a multiplicity’ that participation in 
God can alone offer. Edmond Jabès writes on the theme of the fragmentation of 
mystic speech and its unique efficacy, ‘Only in fragments can we read the
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immeasurable totality’ (42)/^ Through the fragmentation of mysticism and mystic 
speech an approach to the infinite can be located: the purest path, because the path of 
negation allows the attributes of the icon of the divine to be made manifest.
Beyond this, however, are the specific meanings of the beauty of mystic texts 
and their connection to justice. As was mentioned earlier, all too frequently 
contemporary discourse discounts beauty as a frivolous distraction; its significance or 
importance is displaced in favor of analyses of power relations or sociocultural 
difference. A focus on beauty, however, yields a decidedly more optimistic -  yet not 
iiTelevent or unfocused -  viewpoint than much of contemporary critical theory. 
Soelle’s husband comments more directly on the relationship between beauty and 
justice in mysticism, explaining that finding God ‘fragmented into rich and poor, top 
and bottom, sick and well, weak and mighty: that’s the mystic’s suffering. The 
resistance of Saint Francis or Elisabeth of Thuringia or of Martin Luther King grew 
out of the perception of beauty. And the long lasting and most dangerous resistance is 
the one that was born from beauty’ (302). Beauty, as it turns out in this broad 
description that closes Soelle’s book, both informs and encourages resistance to 
injustice; the beauty of mystic texts is specifically singled out as the chief element of 
their efficacy in promoting justice.
Tlu'ough this hermeneutical lens of the uniquely aesthetic components of 
mysticism, we come to an understanding of the strengths particular to the mystic 
coipus. The beautiful and poetic qualities of their writings lead us to a greater concern 
for the world in itself, rather than trying to grasp the world and alter it according to 
our desires, beauty encourages a relationship to the world analogous to the 
relationship between the God of mystical theology and humanity. Just as the goal of 
mysticism is ever necessarily defen'ed, so too does beauty allow us to participate more 
avidly in the world without attempting to control or distort it thi'ough ideology. It 
allows the ego to be simultaneously elevated and reduced, and thus prevents identity
This passage is followed in his The Book o f  Margins by a passage with uncanny relevance to the 
project at hand that deserves further mention; an investigation o f  the relationship between 
fragmentation, deconstruction, and the law. ‘The eye is guide and beacon for this fertile 
“deconstruction” which works in two directions: from totality toward the ultimate fragment, and from 
the tiniest fragment, tlu ough its own rescinding, its own gradual fading into the void o f preponderant 
fragmentation, toward restoration o f this very totality. The eye lays down -  and is -  the law. The 
invisible claims us behind all that is seen, as if  its absence were only what hides at the heart o f the 
manifest -  or else hides from us what is nevertheless manifest -  and silence, what is unsaid within the 
uttered word’ (42). In this dense and allusive passage, Jabès blends the images o f a kenotic movement 
in fragmentation with the apophaticism o f  the invisible. Tluough these confrontations, he seems to lay 
claim, the unsaid is, paradoxically, sayable.
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fonnation to take place in an atmosphere free from the competition over limited 
resources that governs so much of contemporary identity politics. Beauty encourages 
justice through these varying means; mystical texts, in their allusive and rich use of 
language, are very frequently of a profound beauty. With the various theoretical 
formulations developed in these preceding sections in mind, it now seems appropriate 
to turn to some seminal figures in the history of mysticism to see how these concepts 
are born out in their writings.
VII. Neoplatonic Mysticism: Hierarchy, Selflrood, and Kenosis
In this section I investigate the works of tlu*ee major figures of Neoplatonic 
mysticism -  Pseudo-Dionysius the Ai'eopagite, Meister Eckhart, and the anonymous 
author of The Cloud o f Unknowing -  in order to demonstrate the ways in which their 
writings encourage social justice thiough participation in divine hierarchy and 
readerly kenosis. It is this movement that offers a textual link to Denida’s theories on 
justice and deconstruction discussed above: both deconstruction and the mystical texts 
discussed below demand the reader’s understanding of his own limitations and the 
impossibility of absolute knowledge of a text. Although Neoplatonic and apophatic 
mysticism may, on the surface, appear to be a hermetic discipline unconcerned with 
the world around it and focussed solely on a transcendent deity above, I am to 
investigate the ways in which the texts from this tradition speak otherwise. Even as 
abstract and philosophical a text as that presumably written by a reclusive individual 
(likely an anchorite or Carthusian monk) -  The Cloud o f Unknowing -  still maintains 
a remarkable concern for its own transmission and exegesis. It is the textuality of 
these works per se that will be investigated: the particular manner in which the 
exercise of reading itself instantiates in the reader a space for justice to emerge.
First, however, I wish to put forward a connection between this section and 
my earlier discussion of Jacques Derrida; the linlc between them is primarily one of 
linguistic use and the deployment of rhetoric. Derrida’s work often skirts around 
topics of faith and belief, instead focusing on the language of faith and belief 
themselves.^® Does Dem da’s formulation of justice have anything to do with the
This tendency has certainly declined, however, in his more recent works. See in particular his 
autobiographical reinteipretation o f Augustine’s Confessions, Circumfessions m the volume Jacques 
Derrida  (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1993). Jeremy Hall points out in his doctoral 
dissertation {Towards a Postmodern Ethics: Representation, Memory, Responsibility, University o f  
Glasgow: 1999) that although before 1972 Derrida’s work was primarily concerned with epistemology, 
the years since have seen an ‘ethical turn’ in his wiitings (20). I would go further and argue that the
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mystic tradition? Is Derrida himself a ‘mystic’ in any meaningful way? One of 
Derrida’s most forthiight encounters with the mystical tradition can be found in his 
essay ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ m  Languages o f the Unsayable. The 
begiiming of the essay contains an outright denial. ‘No, what I write is not “negative 
theology’” (Budwick and Iser, 7). He accuses negative theologians of ultimately 
inevitably being forced to preserve some sort of ‘hyperessentiality, ’ be it a God 
without being or a God beyond being -  some sort of ontological certitude is 
maintained. A turn occurs, however, in his analysis of Meister Eckhart -  he finds that 
the ‘simultaneously negative and hyperaffinnative meaning of without" (op. cit., 8) in 
his works draws us to redefine the qualities of ‘negative theology’ as found in the 
works of Eckhart and Pseudo-Dionysius (and perhaps might lead us to reconsider his 
earlier denial of ‘negative theology’ itself).
Although he writes: ‘I would hesitate to inscribe what I put forward under the 
familiar heading of negative theology, precisely because of that ontological wager of 
hyperessentiality that one finds at work both in Dionysius and in Meister Eckhart’ 
(ibid.), his analysis draws him ever closer to a reappraisal of that very 
hyperessentiality, particularly through Jean-Luc Marion’s aforementioned God 
Without Being?^ The greatest difference between negative theology and 
deconstruction is that ‘the apophatic movement camiot contain within itself the 
principle of its interruption. It can only indefinitely defer the encounter with its own 
limit’ (op. cit., 11). That is to say, whereas Derrida’s critical work focuses on the 
necessity of language and discourse to bear within itself its own undoing, apophasis 
can only ever push back an ontological horizon that it can never hope to eliminate.
Ultimately, however, these ontological considerations and divergences are 
superseded by a discussion of the rhetorical elements of negative theology that are the 
tmly significant points of convergence with Dem da’s work. Analysing a passage of
past decade or so has seen a ‘religious turn’ in the Denidean coipus, not only with the aforementioned 
Circumfession, but also the collection o f  religiously-themed essays, Acts o f  Religion  (London: 
Routledge, 2001), his penetrating work The Gift o f  Death (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 
1996) and his yearly appearances at the Villanova conference on religion and postmodernism. His 
highly illuminating lectures from these events, as well as the responses o f other speakers and 
transcripts from roundtable discussions, can be found in two volumes edited by John Caputo: God, the 
Gift, and Postmodernism  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) and Questioning God 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
Derrida describes Marion’s work in a footnote as being ‘both very close and extremely distant’ (65). 
For an intelligent analysis o f  the similarities and differences between these two figures from a 
phenomenological perspective, see Robyn Hom er’s Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the 
Limits o f  Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001).
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Pseudo-Dionysius’s Mystical Theology, Derrida writes ‘[wjithout the divine promise 
which is also an injunction, the power of these synthemata would be merely 
conventional rhetoric, poetry, fine arts, perhaps literature. It would suffice to doubt 
this promise or transgress this injunction in order to see an opening -  and also a 
closing upon itse lf-  of the field of rhetoricity or even of literariness, the lawless law 
of fiction’ (op. cit., 23). Here, in essence, Derrida gives us the opportunity to bridge 
the gap between deconstruction and negative theology; whereas they have different 
ontological motivations, their use of language and their forms of negation enable their 
alliance. Both have a central aporia at their heart: how to avoid speaking.
Denida explores this inescapably necessary tension between the impossibility 
of speech and the necessity of through the Divine Names, ‘Between the theological 
movement that speaks and is inspired by the Good beyond Being or by light and the 
apophatic path that exceeds the Good, there is necessarily a passage, a transfer, a 
translation. An experience must yet guide the apophasis toward excellence, not allow 
it to say just anything, and prevent it fi'om manipulating its negations like empty and 
purely mechanical phrases. This experience is that of prayer’ (op. cit., 41). In other 
words, Derrida triumphs the rhetorical trope of prayer in order to prevent the 
language of Dionysian metaphysics h orn straying into useless patter or simple, 
reflexive negation. Instead, the formal characteristics of prayer itself allow Derrida to 
develop the rhetorical strand that links his work to negative or mystical theology; the 
prayers and hymns offered in the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus allow a solution to the 
necessary impossibility of speaking about God.
A. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite
The seminal works of Pseudo-Dionysius, whose works were given authority 
throughout most of the medieval period second only to the scriptures, are rich in the 
concern for a distribution of divine blessing. Although contemporary commentators 
often focus on the very apophatic message of his Mystical Theology and The Divine 
Names, his other two surviving works -  The Celestial Hierarchy and The 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy -  focus primarily on the manner in which the goodness of 
God is distributed tlu'oughout creation. This elusive and enigmatic writer -  in 
actuality a sixth-century Syrian monk rather than the Greek philosopher converted in 
Acts 17:34 -  exerted an unparalleled influence on medieval mysticism; it is with his 
writings that I will begin my investigation.
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The Divine Names, Pseudo-Dionysius’s longest surviving work, is dedicated 
to an analysis and critique of the names given to God. It begins by acknowledging the 
difficulty of the task at hand; ‘the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational 
process. Nor can any words come up to the inexpressible Good, this One, this Source 
of all unity, this supra-existent Being . . .  It is and it is as no other being is. Cause of 
all existence, and therefore itself transcending existence, it alone could give an 
authoritative account of what it really is’ (50). A rather self-defeating choice of words 
with which to open a work of theology, the transcendence of God is emphasized here 
-  in line with my earlier discussion of Jean-Luc Marion’s work, divinity surpasses 
even the category of Being -  and the ability of human language and reason to describe 
or explain Him denigrated. Later on he concisely states the problem at hand; ‘if all 
knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the existent, then whatever 
transcends being must also transcend knowledge’ (53). This self-abasement or self- 
emptying is, I believe, a cmcial acknowledgement of the necessary impossibility of 
theology before a transcendent God; it is also an important aspect of a poetics of 
justice that would seek to assert that no answer to society’s ills can claim to be 
conclusive, no theology an absolute or totalising picture of God. Both are united in a 
common appreciation of the imitation of Christ’s kenosis; whether reading apophatic 
theology or reading justice, a necessary self-emptying must take place as reader or 
believer. A passage through a cloud of unknowing is an indispensable prerequisite to 
the access of a space of knowledge about the transcendent, be it God or justice. It is a 
replication of God’s kenosis in the reader that allows a proper reading of justice to be 
possible. It is in this vein Pseudo-Dionysius asserts that we must ‘leave behind us all 
of our own notions of the divine’ (ibid.).
Pseudo-Dionysius concedes shortly thereafter, however, that ‘on the other 
hand, the Good is not absolutely ineommunicable to everything. By itself it 
generously reveals a firm, transcendent beam, granting enlightenments [sic] 
proportionate to each being, and thereby draws sacred minds upward to its pennitted 
contemplation, to participation and to the state of becoming like it’ (50). Cmcial here 
is the motion of revelation and exegesis: similar to Marion’s discussion of the icon, 
the Good presents itself to the world. Also important is the givenness of this gesture; 
Pseudo-Dionysius emphasizes the way in which theology is granted the ability to 
perceive God, not entitled to it. Most significant, however, is the participatory and 
transformative nature of divine contemplation highlighted in this passage: meditating
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on divine goodness here involves participating in and becoming like it. The 
contemplation of God is figured not as an abstract philosophical activity -  even in this 
massively influential work of philosophical mysticism -  but rather as a process that 
brings its adherents closer to co-existence with the Good, that actively transfonns 
those who seek the Good ‘into a state of becoming like it.’ The consequences of this 
understanding of mysticism for justice are clear: rather than removing the mystic fiom 
the world, mysticism instead allows the mystic to be transfonned into divine 
Goodness (and to operate accordingly in the world). This aporetic moment transforms 
the standard Neoplatonic framework of procession and return into a movement of 
necessary impossibility that allows access to divine inaccessibility. That is to say, 
tlirough this (impossible) divinisation of the mystic the impossibility of justice is 
paradoxically made manifest.
In a similar vein, particularly noteworthy for its syncretism, he writes that ‘we, 
in the diversity of what we are, are drawn together by it and are led into a godlike 
oneness, into a unity reflecting God’ (51). This trope is perhaps the most important 
contribution of the Dionysian corpus towards a poetics of justice. Pseudo-Dionysius 
recognizes both human multiplicity and divine unity and stresses that the latter comes 
to overwhelm the former, hi this language, human differences are not erased but 
rendered inconsequential when raised towards divine unity. The belief in ‘unity in a 
m ultitudeperm eates The Divine Names and lends a significant component to this 
discussion of justice. Pseudo-Dionysius uses a particularly clarifying metaphor in 
order to elucidate this concept of unity in a multitude: ‘in a house the light from all 
the lamps is completely interpenetrating, yet each is clearly distinct. There is 
distinction in unity and there is unity in distinction’ (61). That is to say, our variegated 
participation in the unity of the divine allows both commonality and distinction with 
God; the human multiplicity is transformed into a divine unity that nevertheless 
allows the former to retain its individual distinctions.
This concept is indeed one o f the fundamental problems o f classical thought; the particular phi asing 
here Ï draw from Book XXII o f Augustine’s D e Civitate Dei. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto comments on 
this in broad sti'okes in his excellent synthesis Truth: A History and a Guide fo r  the Perplexed  (New  
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). ‘The oneness o f  everything and the equation, Infinity equals one, are 
borne out by possible constructions o f elementary logic, everyday observations and modern science. 
Infinity is the sum total o f  everything . . . When we identify a single object, we can think of it as an 
infinite number o f fractions o f itse lf (43). Earlier he points to the influence o f  mysticism on this deep- 
rooted and ancient method o f making sense o f  the world. ‘Logic and science are only supporting or 
ancillary sources o f argument in favour o f cohesive world-pictures. The earliest formulations are more 
likely to have been inspired and sustained by mystical experience’ (41).
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At the same time that God is One, however, Pseudo-Dionysius also draws 
attention to the Triune God. Besides demonstrating what he terms a ‘transcendent 
fecundity’ (51), the Trinity also demonstrates God’s concern for creation. The Trinity, 
he reports, is especially called ‘loving toward humanity, because in one of its persons 
it accepted a true share of what it is we are, and thereby issued a call to man’s lowly 
state to rise up to it’ (52). This co-association of Christ and humanity, loosely 
developed here, will reach a stunning clarity in the work of Julian of Norwich nine 
centuries later. The kenotic trope that God lowered himself in order to understand and 
save humanity is mirrored by the assertion that the Incarnation offers us the challenge 
of ourselves becoming Godlike. In a world governed by these principles, one would 
imagine, justice could not but flourish,
Pseudo-Dionysius continues his discussion of the paradoxical co-existence of 
both unity and multiplicity in the Godhead, writing: ‘he is indivisible multiplicity, the 
unfilled overfullness which produces, perfects, and preserves all unity and all 
multiplicity’ (67). This language, replete with the contraries that often typify mystic 
writing, furthers the notion that the divine unity is able to reconcile and preseiwe 
difference among beings even as it draws us towards its own unity. Indeed, the 
plenitude of God mentioned here is exactly what allows this perfection and 
preservation to occur. Even more radically, however, he goes on to say that ‘since 
there are many who are by his gift raised, so far as they can be, to divinization, it 
would seem that here there is not only differentiation but actual replication of the one 
God’ (ibid.). Here, in a reference to the Eucharist, God is indeed replicated tlirough 
his believers; divinisation and divine replication are the surprising fruits of 
contemplation and worship.
This theme of God’s replication is taken up earlier on in the text in the context 
of both creation and incarnation. He writes that God ‘is multiplied and yet remains 
singular’ and ‘is dispensed to all without ceasing to be a unity’ (66). Although this 
initially seems problematic, even paradoxical, Pseudo-Dionysius clarifies and offers a 
resolution. ‘Since God is a “being” in a way beyond being, he bestows existence upon 
everything and brings the whole world into being, so that his single existence is said 
to be manifold by virtue of the fact that it brings so many things to being h om itself 
(ibid.). hi this, creation proceeds h'om God and thus shares its being with his 
transcendence. Once again we find that kenosis brings about generation: he reports 
that tlirough the process of creation God remains ‘full amid the emptying act of
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differentiation’ (ibid.). This tendency in Pseudo-Dionysius’s work is the key to a 
reconciliation of Neoplatonic mysticism with social justice -  or rather, the enrichment 
of our concepts of justice through the mystic’s ascent towards the Good.
In this motion too can be seen a nod towards the textual transmission of 
mysticism; the process of reading and reflecting itself is paralleled here. Just as the 
Oneness of God provokes and inspires a multiplicity of texts, all partaking in 
Goodness, so too does the unity of each text spawn a multiplicity of interpretation, an 
exegetical community in which meaning is constantly being negotiated. Pseudo- 
Dionysius gives us a hint of the possible outcome of such an interaction when he 
discusses the name ‘Peace.’ ‘The first thing to say is this. God is the subsistence of 
absolute peace, of peace in general, and of instances of peace. He brings everything 
together into a unity without confusion, into an undivided communion where each 
thing continues to exhibit its own specific form and is in no way adulterated thiough 
association with its opposite’ (122). Particularly noteworthy here is the claim that in 
the communion granted by God’s peace the union of opposites is possible. This 
movement in which unity is capable of internally resolving -  and just as importantly, 
simultaneously preserving -  contraries is anticipatory of the basic tenets of the 
deconstruction which Denida claims is at the heart of justice.
The Celestial Hierarchy and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy are both concerned 
with how divine gifts are given to humanity. For Pseudo-Dionysius, it is important to 
recognize, ‘hierarchy’ did not have the oppressive connotations it has developed in 
recent years. Although I do not wish to discount the suffering of many at the hands of 
various ‘hierarchies,’ by the same token I do not believe the word is being used 
correctly in such instances. Pseudo-Dionysius is the originator of the term, and I feel 
it is to his writings that we should turn for our definition. The Greek literally means 
‘holy source; ’ in the context of his work the term is applied to the organized and 
ranked system by which the Good proceeds from God. Although it is certainly true 
that rank in human contexts often denotes oppression or mistreatment, it is important 
to recognize that the movement of a Dionysian hierarchy is always continually 
upward; its sole purpose is to raise those who participate in it towards God, not to 
apply power or control from higher to lower.
This is made clear in the opening to The Celestial Hierarchy, in which 
Pseudo-Dionysius considers the meaning of the word he coins. ‘In my opinion a 
hierarchy is a sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity approximating as
43
closely as possible to the divine’ (153). Order, understanding, and activity are the 
central aspects of the Dionysian hierarchy: all are invariably oriented towards the end 
of becoming ‘as like as possible to God’ (154). He continues to define hierarchy, 
writing that a hierarchy ‘bears in itself the mark of God. Hierarchy causes its 
members to be images of God in all respects, to be clear and spotless minors 
reflecting the glow of primordial light and indeed of God himself (ibid.). Here, the 
participants in hierarchy are figured as mirrors of God’s light -  an interesting reversal 
of the Marionic geography of the idol discussed above. Again, the oveiwhelming 
message of this passage is that hierarchy causes its members to mimic or replicate 
God in themselves.
It is a cmcial theme, and one echoed throughout the Dionysian corpus; it 
reaches perhaps its fullest expression in his discussion of the Eucharist in The 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. ‘Every sacredly initiating operation draws our fragmented 
lives together into a one-like divinization’ (209), he writes. Here his language reaches 
some of its gi*eatest social relevance: the fi agmentation of humanity that leads to 
‘impassioned hostility between equals’ (218) becomes impossible when participation 
in the sacraments pulls us towards the divine unity even as we ourselves are divinised. 
This discourse reaches a markedly impassioned climax: ‘it is not possible,’ he writes, 
‘to be gathered together toward the One and to partake of peaceful union with the One 
while we are divided among ourselves’ (ibid.). Here is the practical application of the 
dialectic between unity and multiplicity; the rituals of the church hierarchy are figured 
as uniting those who participate in them, uniting that which would otheiwise be 
divided. This divinisation also offers a useful Dionysian parallel to Derrida’s notion 
of the aporetic; becoming Godlike through participation in a hierarchy must be an 
ever untenable, impossible goal.
This argument regarding unity and multiplicity can be applied quite pointedly 
to contemporary debates concerning identity formation, thereby enriching our 
conception of justice. Regina Schwartz’s The Curse o f Cain ‘locates the origins of 
violence in identity formation, arguing that imagining identity as an act of 
distinguishing and separating fiom others, o f boundary making and line drawing, is 
the most frequent and fundamental act of violence we commit’ (5). The violence 
Schwartz sees in identity formation is quite understandable; her book goes on to 
analyse the coimexion between identity formation, violence, and monotheism in the 
Old Testament. On the other hand, however, it would be difficult to imagine a
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beneficent world entirely devoid of distinction or delineation. And yet, in the 
preceding descriptions of unity and multiplicity, I believe the resolution to this 
opposition can be found. Pseudo-Dionysius describes participation in divine 
hierarchies as both preserving individual characteristics while ensuring a tranquil 
unity -  neither homogeneity nor endless conflict. Only in this context can such 
jarringly discordant concepts be reconciled conclusively.
Describing the development of the Ecclesia, he writes that the early hierarchs 
‘passed on something united in a variegation and plurality’ (199). Again, the fusing of 
disparate, seemingly incompatible contraries is realised tluough hierarchy. Of their 
transmission of liturgical rites and scripture, Pseudo-Dionysius writes that ‘using 
images derived from the senses they spoke of the transcendent. . .  [and] of necessity 
they made human what was divine. They put material on what was immaterial’ (ibid.). 
This crossing of divine and human, made willingly by God in order to draw up 
creation towards Him, is another important facet of this discourse’s contribution to 
justice: the divinisation of man and the kenotic emptying of God are fused.
Divine intentionality is explicitly cited as not only the grounding but also the 
source of hierarchy (and it is here that I find Dionysian mysticism at its gi eatest point 
of divergence from Derridean deconstruction). Pseudo-Dionysius writes that God 
allows us to apperceive Him symbolically, that is, to allow humankind a linguistic 
understanding of the divine, ‘out of concern for us and because he wanted us to be 
made godlike. He made the heavenly hierarchies known to us. He made our own 
hierarchy a ministerial colleague of the divine hierarchies by an assimilation, to the 
extent that it is humanly feasible, to their godlike priesthood’ (147). The language in 
this passage is especially noteworthy: humanity is placed as the passive recipient of 
divinisation. The human hierarchy is described as a ‘ministerial colleague’ of the 
celestial hierarchy: ministerial here can have both the sense of an ancillary or 
instrumental component of a greater process, as well as its more legalistic meaning 
pertaining to the execution of laws given by higher powers. In any event, here the 
conflation of being made godlike and executing authority properly on earth reaches its 
peak; it is to Pseudo-Dionysius’s consideration of law that we will now turn.
In The Celestial Hierarchy Pseudo-Dionysius focuses his attention on the 
foundation of the Law. Although some claim, he reports, that divine law is founded 
tlu'ough an umnediated revelation or apparition of God, he asserts that ‘the Word of 
God teaches us that the Law was given to us by angels’ (157). In other words, any
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attempt to ground the Law in an umnediated experience of God is foolhardy; the 
Law’s foundation is mediated. ‘Before the days of the Law and after it had come,’ he 
writes, ‘it was the angels who uplifted our illustrious ancestors toward the divine and 
they did so by prescribing roles of conduct’ (ibid.). Parallel to Derrida’s 
aforementioned consideration of the foundation of Law, here too we find that the 
attempt is made to find recourse in a transcendental moment of divine authorization. It 
requires mediation and distribution just as surely as it must claim to have unimpeded 
access to the transcendent (be it justice or God).
At the same time, however, Pseudo-Dionysius seems to acknowledge the 
mediatedness of even divine law. ‘Someone might claim that God has appeared 
himself and without intermediaries to some of the saints. But in fact it should be 
realized that scripture has clearly shown that “no one has seen” or ever will see the 
being of God in all its hiddeimess’ (ibid.). So for all the early mention of the self­
revelation and self-lowering of God in tandem with the ascent and divinisation of 
humanity, God’s transcendence and hiddenness is still intact. He aclaiowledges the 
occasional theophany, to be certain, yet nevertheless maintains that although ‘it could 
be argued that in the scriptural tradition the sacred ordinances of the Law were given 
directly by God himself to Moses . . . theology quite clearly teaches that these 
ordinances were mediated to us by angels so that God’s order might show us how it is 
that secondary beings are uplifted through the primary beings’ (157-8). Here Pseudo- 
Dionysius grapples with what seems to be the direct transmission of Law from God to 
Moses; he stretches the definition of ‘angel’ by virtue of its original meaning -  
‘messenger’ -  to apply to prophets. In a sense, this is perfectly valid -  although the 
Law may have been given directly from God to Moses in Exodus, it had to enter into 
written language in order to be applicable; with writing comes interpretation, 
exegesis, translation -  in a word, mediation. Law, the attempt to embody God’s 
justice on earth, must perforce be subject to human contexts; participation in 
hierarchy allows it to move ever closer to its infinitely just source -  the only such 
possible source an opening onto impossibility.
It is only after we have come to such an understanding of the role of Law and 
hierarchy -  and their mutual relationship to the Good -  that we can appreciate 
Pseudo-Dionysius’s comments on justice in his letters. It is in a letter to the monk 
Demophilius that he writes straightfoiwardly that the ‘Word of God commands us “to 
pursue just things justly,” and justice is pursued when each wishes to give every one
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his due. And this must always be pursued justly by all’ (275). That is to say, the 
commitment to uphold hierarchy, to continue to participate in it as fully as possible, is 
an essential facet of Dionysian justice. One must bear in mind, however, the full 
implications of the term ‘hierarchy’ mentioned above in order to understand the 
significance of this -  and to avoid seeing this interdependent and graduated system as 
a necessarily oppressive system (indeed, in Paradise Lost, that is precisely Satan’s 
mistake). Hierarchy in and of itself does not bear the marks of oppression; only when 
cut off from its sacred source does it posses this potentiality (and, incidentally, does it 
also lose any of its etymological significance). Although hierarchy does seem to 
indicate in his works a progressive, stepped relationship between God and creation, a 
noteworthy outcome of this worldview is the communal element of worship that is 
thus stressed. In the final analysis, divine mediation through hierarchy does not 
represent a necessary oppression of the individual, but can instead point towards a 
subsuming divinisation of the individual.
It is in this vein that Pseudo-Dionysius declares in the same letter that through 
‘the mediation of the primary beings, those of secondary rank receive whatever has 
been assigned to them by that Providence which is harmonious and thoroughly just’ 
(ibid.). Resonating with the earlier discussion of the divinisation wrought tlirough 
hierarchy, this passage emphasises instead the mediation by which earthly creatures 
receive heavenly gifts. The twofold progression of mediation and divinisation -  both 
thi'ough hierarchy -  governs the movement of justice in the Dionysian corpus. Both 
also involve a degree of aporia: tlirough mediation, an endless process of negotiation 
and revaluation is invoked; thi'ough divinisation, a journey is begun towards the ever- 
elusive goal of likeness to God. This process of mediation and divinisation thiough 
hierarchy represents the aporetic nature of justice in Pseudo-Dionysius and the 
necessity of differentiation in the application of justice. The sacredness of a divine 
source is meted out through a system which inevitably, invariably draws its 
participants upwards towards the Godhead and toward a state of becoming like to 
God; tlii'ough such a process the subjects within it are in a constant state of mutability.
In other words, justice requires an opeimess to the possibility and inevitability 
of change; just as Derrida’s justice springs from an unbridgeable aporia, so too does 
justice in Pseudo-Dionysius rely on the intrinsically aporetic notion of divinisation 
through hierarchy. Taken at the root, the force of Pseudo-Dionysian mysticism in 
relation to justice is the necessarily impossible drive towards an instantiation of God
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within the community and individual: this unachievable target keeps a society from 
lapsing into a moral stasis (stemming from complacency) or reverting to a moral 
authoritarianism (stemming from over-certainty). In this sense, both Derridean and 
Pseudo-Dionysian models require an essential break or rupture within the very 
stmcture of justice itself: we must constantly be taught what we do not loiow and be 
reminded of the limits of both our understanding and fulfilment of justice in order to 
be true to justice per se. Dedication to justice requires a degi'ee of unknowing, a 
recognition of the capacity and limits of human understanding, and a belief that 
justice can never be fully deployed or entirely achieved in this world. Reading 
Pseudo-Dionysius’s consistently self-questioning work of apophatic mysticism aids us 
in recognising these limitations -  while also spuning us towards a greater 
participation in the divine. Only through the constant attempt to reach what we camiot 
but fail to reach can justice be realised.
B. The Cloud o f Unimowing
Pseudo-Dionysius’s influence is clearly manifest in a fourteenth-century 
English mystical text by an anonymous author, widely supposed to be a Carthusian 
monk: The Cloud o f Unlmowing. The author o f this work also translated the Mystical 
Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius into Middle English as Deonise Hid Divinité; the 
influence of Dionysian mysticism and Neoplatonic thought on this elusive author is 
evident thi'oughout The Cloud o f  Unlmowing. Near the end of the text he makes his 
affinities clear: ‘[a]nd herfore it was that Seynte Denis seyde: “The most goodly 
knowyng of God is that, the whiche is knowyn bi unknowyng’” (2370-1). The text 
itself reads more as an instruction manual for a would-be mystic attempting a 
Neoplatonic ascent to the One than the metaphysical hymns and nomenclatural 
analyses that permeate the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. Nevertheless its analysis of 
selfliood and the dissolution of the self that takes place in the journey into the 
mystical ‘cloud of unknowing’ bears significant import for the discussion of justice at 
hand.
The text advises the potential practitioner to leave behind him all the 
knowledge of the world, to place those things in a cloud of forgetting in order to 
ascend to the cloud of unknowing in which God might be found. In this tenuous and 
aporetic position, poised between two apophatic ‘clouds,’ the ascetic is encouraged to 
strike ‘apon that thicke cloude of unlmowyng with a scharp darte of longing love’
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(463-4). Thi'ough this act of love, the Cloud-author maintains, the ascetic can achieve 
a union with God. This love entirely transcends any attempt at reaching God tlirough 
disputation of learning. ‘For whi He may wel be loved, bot not thought. By love may 
He be getyn and holden; bot bi thought neither’ (457-8). Only thr ough a path of both 
renunciation of worldly knowledge and expression of love can the aspiring mystic 
hope to have an appreciation or understanding of God.
This leads, however, to a significant dissolution of selfliood as well. Although 
the medieval sense of the self differed considerably from modem and postmodern 
conceptions (that is to say, the predominant trope of medieval selfhood focusing on 
the relationship between the individual and the transcendent, a focus largely lost in 
modern and postmodern theories of selfliood), the Cloud-author’s emphasis on the 
importance of the abandonment of self show that the dissolution of selfhood is not 
solely a modern or postmodern concern. Rather, many writers in the medieval period 
were astutely aware of the difficulties of selfhood and the problems that society 
placed on an individual’s subjectivities.^^ The Cloud-author, at any rate, is keen to 
provide solutions for individuals wishing closer union with God. After practicing a 
particular form of meditation, the Cloud-author reports that ‘schortly withoutyn thiself 
wil I not that thou be, ne yit aboven, ne behynde, ne on o side, ne on other. “Wher 
than,” seist thou, “schal I be? Nogwhere, by thi tale!” Now trewly thou seist wel; for 
there wolde I have thee. For whi noghwhere bodily is everywhere goostly’ (2293-7). 
The dissolution of the bodily self is here seen as a necessary prerequisite to the 
expansion of one’s spiritual vision or understanding. The author’s literalness in 
describing the incredulity of the aspiring mystic is indicative, perhaps, of the 
difficulty of the concepts involved; the strong conceptual reversals seen in Pseudo- 
Dionysius are here transmuted into more physical, practical teims.
The breaking down of the bodily self here exhorted leads us towards the 
wholly other divinity thi ough a spiritual ascent and a sublimation of the self. Dorothee 
Soelle writes on the drive towards egolessness more broadly, commenting that across 
the centuries of the Cliristian mystical tradition a sublimation of the self is cmcial
This tendency can also be seen in the patristic period: Augustine’s Confessions, for instance, is 
riddled with questions o f selfhood. He opens the chapter on his adolescence by explaining: “I will tiy 
now to give a coherent account o f my disintegrated s e lf ’ (II, 1,1); he writes later, “I was at odds with 
myself, and fragmenting m yself’ (VIII, 10, 22). He writes that a “human being is an immense abyss” 
(IV, 14, 22) even as he exclaims to God “[h]ow unfathomable the abyss o f  your judgments!” (IV, 4, 8). 
Augustine, o f  course, wielded immense influence tliroughout the medieval period; his authority as one 
o f the chief fathers o f the Church was umivalled in the context o f  medieval intellectual life.
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aspect of movement towards or greater understanding of God. She writes, ‘it is 
necessary to forget the ego, and that is exactly what the mystical tradition has in mind 
when it comiects remembering God and forgetting the ego. The process wherein the 
ego ceases to forget God is the same as the one wherein it begins to forget itself 
(211). The forgetting of the self is an essential component of the move towards the 
wholly other divinity. In this investigation, mysticism’s recumng drive towards 
selflessness allows a refashioning of subject formation that allows a greater opemiess 
to and acceptance of the Other.
This movement towards the wholly other, however, is coupled in The Cloud o f  
Unknowing with a concurrent movement towards the Other more broadly defined: the 
societal ‘Other,’ which often is figured as the culturally different, marginalized, and 
thus excluded aspect of any society. Much postmodern thought has focused on 
modernity’s exclusion and marginalization of the Other and has attempted to 
rehabilitate our awareness of this more sinister side of modernity’s totalising 
discourse; here a pre-modem thinker offers us a unique insight into a re-evaluation of 
identity formation that might similarly revalue the importance of the Other. In this 
reappraising vein, the Cloud-author offers an exposition of charity tlu'ough the 
standard dual commandment to love God and to love one’s neighbour. He explains 
that love of God (which is necessary in the overall scheme of the text for ascent 
tlirough the cloud of unknowing which separates mankind from God) must lead to 
love of one’s neighbour because of the very dissolution of selfliood that inheres in 
love of God.
He writes that in the course of mystical practice, ‘in this werke a parfite 
worcher hath no special beholdyng unto any man by himself, whether that he be sib or 
fremmyd [kin or stranger], freende or fo. For alle men think hym iliche sib [seem to 
him alike kin] unto hym, and no man fi'emmid. Alle men him think ben his freendes, 
and none his foen’ (1073-1076). Tlii'ough this understanding of charity, the Cloud- 
author reformulates his conception of selfhood: the follower of his treatise here, 
thi'ough his abandonment of self, is able to recognize verisimilitude and kinship in the 
Other. It is in direct relationship to his abandomiient of self that he is able to see the 
commonality between himself and others around him; the kinship forged through this 
re-examination of selfhood precludes the violence traditionally associated with 
interpersonal competition. The intercoimection and interdependence of humanity is 
stressed in this passage, highlighting the need to recognise a common ground for a
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humanity rooted in compassion. The sort of kinship proposed -  unity in multiplicity -  
does not serve to divide kinship groups or exert power, but rather to establish a 
brotherhood firmly entrenched in recognition of the love of God for mankind.
Tlii'ough an understanding of the sublation or Aufltehun^^ of the limited self into the 
infinite divinity, selfhood can be redefined in a manner more conducive to 
participation in the poetics of justice outlined in this project.
These concepts developed in The Cloud o f  Unlmowing bear relevance not only 
to the history of Christian mysticism, I believe they have a substantially broader 
import in the overall development of a poetics of justice. In order to illustrate some of 
these points of convergence, it is helpful to turn momentarily to a work of 
contemporary theory that deals with similar problems of selfhood. Regina Schwartz 
writes astutely on the theme of identity and violence in her work The Curse o f Cain; 
her primary concern in the text is the oscillation between models of divine scarcity 
and divine plenitude in the Hebrew Bible and the consequent violence that follows 
when scarcity is predicated as a divine attribute. She also comments on the 
importance of a selfliood created with an opemiess towards the Other that bears 
important weight to the present discussion of The Cloud o f Unlmowing. Identity 
formation forged in the light of principles of divine scarcity, she argues, is the root 
cause of the monotheistic tradition’s violent heritage. ‘Violence is not only what we 
do to the Other. It is prior to that. Violence is the very construction of the Other’ (5): a 
rigid division between self and other, particularly when coupled with a vision of 
God’s Oneness as a fomi of scarcity, leads to violence and injustice.
On the other hand, however, she writes that when ‘identity is mobile and 
multiple, the Other is difficult to name -  and to hurt’ (20). Identity formation, figured 
here in terms of opemiess and mutability, can be achieved without the rigidity of 
selfliood that leads to the construction of an Other (and the consequent violence of 
that process). That is to say, the very difficulty of naming that Schwartz sees in the 
mobility and multiplicity of ideal identity foiination -  analogous to mysticism’s 
recuiTent preoccupation with the necessary impossibility of naming God -  prevents a 
sense of selfhood predicated upon the existence of an Other. If the self is always 
changing and always progressing, the lines between self and Other blur, fade, or cease
‘Sublation’ is the most common English tianslation for this Hegelian term which indicates both the 
simultaneous destruction and preservation o f both elements being fused tlirough dialectic. It also 
captures a certain degree o f the ‘raising up’ or ‘elevation’ that occurs tlnough Hegelian synthesis 
through its assonance with ‘sublimation.’
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to matter. Within a model of scarcity, such lines must be guarded, patrolled, and 
policed in order to protect resources or defend identity; in a paradigm centred on 
plenitude, the picture becomes far more open, unresolved, and mutable.
Instead of a vision of scarcity, Schwartz is keen to emphasize the role of 
divine plenitude and multiplicity in identity fonnation free from the stain of conflict. 
She sees non-identical repetition as a crucial component of the resolution of these 
difficulties; the possibility of figuring God as predicated upon principles of abundance 
allows a respite from the disputes of selfliood and identity often found in societies 
contemporary and ancient, religious and secular. ‘An understanding of mimetic desire 
suggests that once you start loving, either you lose your identity or else the loved one 
does: someone loses. But if repetition is never identical, new creations, new 
possibilities, signal new identities, rather than rivalry for the Same. Plenitude 
proliferates identities without violence. And when such plenitude is figured as a God, 
it is as a God who gives and goes on giving endlessly without being used up’ (117-8). 
In other words, by envisioning a God whose Oneness gives rise to plenitude rather 
than scarcity, boundaries can be made between self and Other that accord with divine 
love. The sublation of the self in God’s plenitude allows for an infinite differentiation 
without competition for the finite; identity is instead grounded in God’s infinite love.
In this movement, a Marionic gesture can be found -  rather than allowing the 
inevitable human material conditions of scarcity that arise to be reflected onto our 
notions of God (as in the case of the idol), Schwartz instead proposes a vision of God 
in line with Marion’s icon. God is not a reflection of our concerns and limitations; our 
representations of and discourse about God must not bear the marks of these 
conspicuously human conditions. Rather, God’s love must be allowed to define Him 
and direct our discourse about Him; the particularly troublesome notions of Self and 
Other must be dealt with in a similar fashion, remaining open to the infinite divinity. 
The consequent opening onto divine plenitude allows a theory of identity formation to 
emerge that is markedly distinct fr om secular models; the love of God allows the 
significant emergence of identity tlu'ough a unity in multiplicity that finds resonance 
across the Clnistian mystic tradition. Through this lens a distinct understanding of 
justice might be moved towards: a poetics of justice that escapes fonnulation and 
definitive theorising and instead prefers the flourishing of an opemiess and a 
commonality of identity. This is uniquely possible through the Johamiine formulation
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of God’s connaturality with love. It is in the light that we return to the Cloud-author in 
order to analyse his deployment of love and its role in identity formation.
It is thi'ough love, the Cloud-author writes, that commonality of kinship is 
possible. The dissolution of self discussed above allows for a significant re-evaluation 
of selfliood and otherness; love here is used to rehabilitate the relationship of self to 
other in a fi'aniework of commonality. He writes that ‘[IJove is soche a might that it 
niakith alle thing comoun’ (367). The simple statement disguises a significant 
ontological reformation: love’s power is capable of making differences dissolve into 
commomiess. This claim has significant bearing on subjectivity: the ability to dissolve 
one’s own personal boundaries and see kinship in all one’s fellow humans is arrived 
at tlu'ough this divine love in which all things are common.
He continues, ‘[kjnyt thee therfore to Him bi love and by beleve; and than by 
vertewe of that knot thou schalt be comoun parcener with Him and with alle that by 
love so be knittyd unto Him’ (371-3). Through love and faith, the Cloud-author 
maintains, a knitting or tying to the divine is possible so intimate that one can be a 
‘common partner’ with Him; here the practice of love that has already been shown to 
break down barriers between Self and Other is also of such magnitude that unites the 
practitioner to a common partnerhood with God. The divinisation through hierarchy to 
be found in Pseudo-Dionysius’s corpus reaches a more individuated status (as to be 
expected from an author very likely a hennit) in The Cloud o f Unknowing. It should 
be noted that this is perhaps the greatest divergence from Dionysian orthodoxy in the 
Cloud-author’s work: Denys Turner writes cogently that the Cloud-author replaces the 
‘sophisticated, nuanced, dialectical hierarchy of self-negating dissimilar and similar 
similarities’ that characterises Pseudo-Dionysius’s worldview with ‘a simple, 
uniform, non-dialectical progression towards simplification which is broken off by 
love’s denial of all laiowledge tout court, to be replaced by the alternative and rival 
laiowing of love’ (199). In both Pseudo-Dionysius and The Cloud o f  Unknowing, 
however, what is especially pertinent to the argument at hand is their common 
concern for the dissolution, emptying, and crossing over of identities in the process of 
ascent towards God.
These crossed and interpenetrating identities of Self and Other, human and 
divine, are indeed elemental aspects of the language of mysticism as such. Besides
The Middle English has the sense, as today, both o f  common ownership and o f  common occurrence 
-  an important inteipenetr'ation o f meanings that reverberates throughout the text.
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being thematically emphasised in mystic texts, one may also find rhetorical 
instantiations of these crossings embedded within the language of the texts 
themselves. Michel de Certeau writes persuasively that mystic speech ‘was 
fundamentally “translational.” It crossed the lines. It created a whole by unceasing 
operations upon foreign words’ (1992, 118). Mystic speech operates in part, de 
Certeau maintains, by allowing a constant rupture of the boundaries between Self and 
Other; its effectiveness resides in its constant manoeuvrings between and across 
disciplines, gem*es, and, perhaps most fundamentally, ways of speaking. It also 
necessitates a similar mpture and metamorphosis in the divisions between humanity 
and God.
De Certeau makes a distinction between, on the one hand, a theology that 
would see divine language as divorced from its historical or cultural background, and 
consequently to be evaluated solely on internal cohesiveness and truth claims '^^ and, 
on the other hand, a mystics^'^ that sees divine language as historically situated and 
inextricably comiected to its speaker. To put it another way, de Certeau salvages 
theology from being an ahistorical system for the generation of ‘truth’ and instead 
wishes to see the mystical component of theology synchronically, as a continuing 
process of individual voices. Thiough this exegetical framework, mystics emerges 
both as a historically-rooted cultural phenomenon (hence his synchronic analyses of 
mysticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and a diachi onic exchange of 
voices, themes, and concepts that can be traced across the Chiistian tradition (hence 
his more overarching claims about tendencies in mystic speech).
Along these lines, de Certeau develops the distinctive qualities of mystic 
speech, in particular its divine authorisation in the mystic text. He claims the mystic 
realises that since ‘the Speaking Word must exist even though it may become 
inaudible, he temporarily substitutes his speaking /  for the inaccessible divine / .  . .
He elaborates on this; ‘[t]o the extent that the world is no longer perceived as spoken by God, that it 
has become opacified, objectified, and detached from its supposed speaker, two orientations organize 
the ways o f treating this new linguistic situation. One takes up the statements disorbed fiom  the system  
that gave them the value o f “spoken words” [“paroles"]> isolated fiom  their Enunciator by history, to 
consider them as statements to be appraised and ordered according to internal tmth criteria’ (188). This, 
it can be seen, is theology conceived o f ‘pliilosophically’ -  when ‘philosophy’ is taken to mean the 
analytic tradition. De Certeau is opposed to this method o f analysis, preferring instead a system that 
‘focuses on the speech act itself, which made itself heard by faith . . . The mystic is oriented to this 
second perspective’ (ibid.).
This is the translator’s neologism for de Certeau’s use o f la mystique, a term more specific and 
historically grounded than would be translated via ‘mysticism.’ See pages i x - x  for a fuller explanation 
o f de Certeau's French terminology and the translator’s attempt to capture the sense and subtlety o f  it.
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Like the position (also contradictory) of “author,” the mystic sustains the question that 
cannot be forgotten but cannot be resolved either: that of the speaking subject. He 
“holds” this void in suspense’ (op. cit., 188). Here, the dissolution of the self is 
coupled with the assumption of the divine self in order to authorise the mystic’s 
message; the lack of divine speech now necessitates the deployment of the mystic as 
productive of divine speech per se. The identity of the subject or speaking voice in 
mysticism is constantly held open, in suspense, and unresolved. By necessity the 
mystic text is characterised by an opposition to closure: just as mystic speech itself 
must be an irresolvable movement from speaking I  to inaccessible divine /, so too 
must the text remain ever fluid and ever indetenninate.
The next requirement in de Certeau’s fr amework is the space for this mystic 
and ‘divine’ speech to take place: ‘[tjliis /  who speaks in the place of (and instead of) 
the Other also requires a space of expression corresponding to what the world was in 
relation to the speech of God’ (ibid.). In other words, the mystic’s impossible -  yet 
necessary -  assumption of the divine /  requires in turn a place in which its voice can 
be heard, can be projected. The space created for mystic speech to take place in is, de 
Certeau asserts, the soul. He writes that the ‘soul becomes the place in which that 
separation o f  selffrom itself prompts a hospitality, now “ascetic,” now “mystic,” that 
makes room for the other. And because that “other” is infinite, the soul is an infinite 
space’ (op. cit., 195, italics his). Particularly cmcial here is his link between 
dissolution of self with hospitality, the vanquishing of the all-important ego leads not 
to apathy towards or detaclnnent fi'om the world, but rather a more vigorous 
involvement in it. The infinite other requires an infinite hospitality; the mystic’s soul, 
in replacing what the world is for the speech o f God, is able to fulfil this need. The 
need to sublate the ego into the divine (as the intended authorization of mystic speech) 
and the soul into the world (as the requisite audience of mystic speech) leads not to a 
destmction of the Other or the Self but to an infinite accommodation towards the 
Other by the Self.
In respect to this infinite accommodation heralded by the transformations of 
mystic speech, de Certeau’s analysis of the dual motion of particular to universal (that 
is, of both speaker and soul) ensures that the violent tendency implicit in monotheistic 
scarcity is avoided. That is to say, this tendency that inheres in mystic speech to 
sublate the self into God and the soul into the world opens up a space in which 
otherness is absorbed yet remains distinct. In mystic speech otherness is
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paradoxically, dialectically both destroyed and preserved. As Schwartz points out, the 
‘One suggests both single and All, exclusive and complete’ (33); the Oneness of God 
potentially contains both possibilities. This is both the promise and the thi'eat of the 
universalism implied in the discussion of de Certeau above. Mysticism, in this regard, 
allows a space to emerge in which the Oneness o f God might be imagined as both 
preserving and destroying selfhood in God and language: the Aufhebung of the mystic 
into both the divine and the written.
Schwartz’s analysis goes on to propose an alternative to the risks of an all- 
encompassing universalism, maintaining the need for differentiation. She continues, 
the ‘danger of universalism is that totalization will incoiporate all difference. Wliat 
needs to be imagined is neither a circle that includes everyone -  a whole that 
submerges and subjects all individuality to itself, a totality that closes possibility -  nor 
a part that reviles all other parts’ (ibid.). This vision of inclusion finds a middle 
gi'ound between conflict-ridden atomism and the sedate homogenisation of absolute 
universality. I see the language of mysticism as being particularly conducive to this 
vision of a just enviromnent for identity fonnation. The fragmentation or 
woundedness of mystic speech mentioned earlier prevents totality fi'om being 
realised; its groundedness in the transcendent predisposes it away from the sort of 
troublesome atomism Schwartz also alludes to in this passage. The crossing of divine 
and human realms tlirough kenosis emphasised in mystic texts precludes any sort of 
ideological totality fiom being assumed: mysticism is constantly reminding us of the 
gaps in our knowledge and the limits or breaking points of the words we use in pursuit 
of knowledge. Mysticism creates a middle ground between the particularity of self 
(and stringent boundaries between Self and Other that lead to violence and injustice) 
and the totalisation and equally troublesome subsuming of difference possible in the 
totality of universalism.
C. Meister Eckhart
The writings of the Dominican theologian Meister Eckhart rank among some 
of the most incandescent and controversial in the western Cliristian mystic tradition. 
Although little is laiown definitively about his life, it seems that he spent most of his 
career in Cologne (where he likely received some instruction fiom Albertus Magnus)
-  although he occupied the Dominican chair of theology at the University of Paris for 
some years. It is important to note the heresy trial against Eckhart, instigated by the
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Ai'chbishop of Cologne. He insisted to his death of his innocence, producing defences 
both written and oral of the orthodoxy of his thought.
Nevertheless, in 1329 John XXII promulgated the Bull ‘In agro dominico,’ 
posthumously condemning twenty-six articles of Eckhart’s teaching as ‘thorns and 
obstacles contrary to the very clear truth of faith’ (McGimi, ed., 77). Scholars debate 
the veracity of the claims of the Bull, finding patristic and biblical support for many 
of the condeimied articles. At any rate, Eckhart’s work -  his preaching in particular -  
was filled with in quantum or ‘insofar as’ statements designed to provide rhetorical 
force to his arguments; the Bull, to its great credit, recognises this, telling us that 
Meister Eckliart ‘professed the Catholic faith at the end of his life and revoked and 
also deplored the twenty-six articles . . . insofar as they could generate in the minds of 
the faithful a heretical opinion’ (italics mine, op. cit., 81). Many of his more volatile 
remarks must be understood in the framework of this in quantum principle -  for 
example, his discussion of the just man insofar as he is just assumes a formal or 
abstract consideration of the just man solely as just, per se.
Although many contemporary writers focus on the Meister’s vernacular 
works, praising its unique and often explosive use of Middle High Geiman, a 
thorough consideration of his thought must take into account his extensive Latin 
works as well. Eckhart’s commentary on the Gospel of John provides a useful 
example of the radicality and astuteness that his Latin thought can achieve and is 
particularly relevant to this project. This work can be considered more eisegetical than 
exegetical: that is to say, rather than taking out ideas fi'om the scripture (the ex~ of 
exegetical), Eckhart is keen to attribute into the Gospel of Jolm concepts not readily 
apparent in the text as such. He prefaces this conceptual insertion on the prologue of 
the gospel, writing that it is ‘also clear that these words of the Evangelist, if correctly 
investigated, teach us the natures and properties of things both in their existence and 
their operation, and so while they build up our faith, they also instruct us about the 
nature of things’ (126). With this justification behind him, and with no further 
warning or explanation, he leaps into an analysis of the just man insofar as he is just.
He offers fifteen points of explication on this theme, leading towards a 
Christological understanding of the just man and an Incaniational relationship 
between the just man and justice; constraints of space preclude my here analysing all 
fifteen. The third article, however, is particularly revealing: the ‘just man is the word 
of justice, that by which justice expresses and manifests itself. If justice did not
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justify, no one would have knowledge of it, but it would be known to itself alone’ 
(126-7). Eckhart here stresses the discursive nature of justice: the need for mysticism 
more generally to be expressed beyond itself has been discussed earlier (in relation to 
Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit); the movement here is for justice itself to move into 
discourse in order to be understood more broadly. Particularly significant is the 
linguistic turn: by writing that the just man is the word of justice, the Meister focuses 
our attention on the role that language and reading have in the process of justice.
Eckliart goes on to refigure the relationship between the just man and justice 
in hicarnational terms. First he writes that ‘justice has an exemplar in itself, which is 
the likeness or idea in which and according to which it forms and informs or clothes 
every just man and thing’ (127). That is to say, justice bears within itself an archetype 
from which instantiations are to be made: justice already carries the possibility of 
replication in the world (in Incaniational terms, of course, Ecldiart is simply 
reaffinning the orthodox belief in the procession of the Trinity). He continues, writing 
that the ‘just man proceeds h'om and is begotten by justice and by that very fact is 
distinguished from it. . . Nonetheless, the just man is not different in nature h'om 
justice . . . the just man is the offspring and son of justice’ (ibid.). Here the thi'ust of 
Eckhart’s argument is clear: the relationship between justice and the just man is 
identical with that between God the Father and Chiist. hi other words, this discussion 
centres on a fundamentally human consideration of justice: the in quantum principle 
by which these passages are to be read blurs the lines between justice and incarnation. 
The ability to talk about the just man insofar as he is just (that is, in strictly foimal or 
hypothetical terms) is linlced with Trinitarian discussion that allows for discussion of 
Christ insofar as he is divine or human. The purely formal divisions that the in 
quantum method allows are never instantiated in the world: as Christ’s humanity is 
ever inextricably linked to his divinity, so too does the just man exist only through, 
with, and injustice.
In Meister Eckhart’s vernacular sermons the theme of divinisation returns, 
along with its concomitant implications on justice, hi his Middle High Gennan 
sermon on the text justi vivent in aeternum, he asserts that ‘God’s being is my life. If 
my life is God’s being, then God’s existence must be my existence and God’s is-
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ness^^ is my is-ness, neither less nor more’ (187). This, understandably, attracted the 
attention of the Cologne and Avignon officials assigned to assemble the dossier of 
heterodox statements for Eckhart’s heresy proceedings. Yet, as has been seen earlier 
in this section, the theme of becoming one with God -  divinisation -  has been played 
out across the Cliristian mystic tradition. In any event, this absolute interpenetration of 
being that the Meister proposes has radical implications for justice. ‘For just men,’ he 
writes in the same seimon, ‘the pursuit of justice is so imperative that if  God were not 
just, they would not give a fig for God; and they stand fast by justice . . . Nothing is 
more painful or hard for a just man than what is contrary to justice’ (186). These 
strong words, chosen in a rhetorical manoeuvre to rouse his audience towards truth, 
demonstrate Eckliart’s dedication towards both the co-identity of creator and creation 
and the according emphasis placed on justice.
The path towards union with God for Eckhart remains the same as we have 
seen in Pseudo-Dionysius and the Cloud-author: love.^^ ‘Some simple people think 
that they will see God as if he were standing there and they here. It is not so. God and 
I, we are one. I accept God into me in knowing; I go into God in loving’ (188). The 
twofold relationship between God and mankind outlined here consists of laiowledge 
and love: God enters humanity through the intellect, so to speak, and humanity enters 
God through the heart. Especially important is Ecldiart’s quickness to discount 
‘visions’ of God in the coiporeal or material sense: he delineates clearly the entirely 
separate ontological stratum in which God dwells; visions of God must accordingly be 
of a nature altogether different fiom corporeal sight.
Eckhart even goes so far in this attempt to reach a God beyond ontology as to 
challenge (albeit obliquely, in the context of an in quantum proposal, and in the 
vernacular) the Trinitarian basis of Cliristian doctrine, hi his seimon on the theme ‘all 
things that are alike love one another and unite with one another, and all things that
This term (in the original, isticheit), coined by Eckliart, ‘appears in the Cologne [heresy] 
proceedings, where isticheit is rendered as quidditas (“what-it-is”), but it is not certain what Eckliart 
had in mind, for his response here is totally in terms o f  esse or “existence”’ (337).
Such claims for the ti ansformative properties o f  love are by no means uncommon. St John o f  the 
Cross, for example, cites Gal. 2:20 as a scriptural authorisation for this view, commenting ‘in saying “I 
live, now not I,” he meant that even though he had life it was not his because he was transformed in 
Clii'ist, and it was divine more than human . . .  In accord with this likeness and transformation, we can 
say that his life and Cluist’s were one life tlnough union o f  love’ (518). This attiibution o f  the fusing o f  
two into one tlnough love (often figured in terms o f romantic love), a ti ope common to the rhetoric o f  
courtly love, has had a wide-ranging impact on the mystic tradition, taking the Song o f Songs as its 
primary scriptural support. See also John McIntyre’s excellent tieatment o f the significance o f  love in 
Clnistian theology more broadly: On the Love o f  God  (London: Collins, 1962).
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are unlike flee from one another and hate one another’ (197) he describes the 
uncreated aspect of the soul (traditionally understood as the intellect) as a light or a 
spark that ‘comprehends God without a medium, uncovered, naked, as he is in 
himself (198). The soul wishes to Icnow God without mediation. This spark, perfectly 
detached from worldly things, the Meister asserts, ‘is not content with the simple 
divine essence in its repose . .  . but it wants to know the source of this essence, it 
wants to go into the simple ground, into the quiet desert, into which distinction never 
gazed, not the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit’ (ibid.). Here Eckliart envisions 
the uncreated aspect of the soul seeking a divine essence beyond its Trinitarian 
attributes. Although he is certain to delineate very clearly that the spark of the soul 
seeks to move beyond the persons of the Trinity only insofar as they are personal 
attributes, it is easy to see the alarm that this passage might have caused in Cologne 
and Avignon. The striking imagery he defiantly deploys calls to mind the tropes of 
both journeying and emptying; the soul’s passage into a ‘quiet deserf in order to find 
a God beyond or without being has a striking resonance with both the apophatic and 
monastic traditions.^® The essential displacedness that this mention of simple ground 
and quiet deserts conjures is significant: it implies a subject ever moving closer to the 
tmth beyond appearances without ever arriving, a discontentedness with the present 
that presses the individual ever onwards in pursuit of ultimate tmths.
Denys Turner offers a penetrating analysis of the differences between 
Dionysian and Eckhartian language in his work The Darkness o f God. ‘Denys 
[Pseudo-Dionysius] is, as it were, content to let theological language break down 
under the weight of its internal contradictoriness . . .  it is his strategy to let language 
pass over into a silence o f its own making’ (151). As has been seen above, Dionysian 
language is rigorously aware of its own limitations; although Meister Eckhart 
undoubtedly has the same apophatic awareness, ‘there is in Eckliart a certain 
rhetorical strenuousness: he twists the discourse, breaks it up, recomposes it. His 
rhetorical devices are artifices. Whereas Denys lets language collapse into silence and 
tlirough the cessation of speech express the apophatic. Eckhart wants to force the 
imagery to say the apophatic’ (ibid.). Turner makes this very valid point: Eckhart’s
Edmond Jabès writes movingly on the relationship between language o f the desert and apophaticism 
(o f a sort). ‘The experience o f  the desert is both the place o f  the Word -  where it is supremely word -  
and the non-place where it loses itself in the infinite. So that we never know whether we catch it at the 
moment it springs up or at the moment it begins ever so slowly to fade: the dazzling moment o f  its 
issue or its imperceptible vanishing’ (172).
60
language is ever stretching against its constraints, desperately seeking whatever 
rhetorical device is necessary to make God manifest in his texts themselves. His 
brazen linguistic manoeuvres are a direct result of his constant struggle to express the 
ineffable divinity: thus his confrontation with fourteenth-century authorities, thus his 
interest to contemporary postmodern philosophers and theologians.^^ The language of 
the vernacular sermons in particular demonstrates Eckhart’s endless struggle with 
these contradictions. Writes Turner, in language strongly reminiscent of the earlier 
section on mystic speech (and its concomitant implications for justice), ‘he will use 
speech, necessarily broken, contradictory, absurd, paradoxical, conceptually 
hyperbolic speech, to bring to insight the ineffability of God’ (ibid.).
Ecldiart preaches on 1 John 4:8 in Latin sermon VI, and it is here, as is to be 
expected, that the rhetoric of love and being inteipenetrate to their fullest extent.
“‘God is love” first because love is common to all, excluding no one’ (212), Eckhart 
writes, recalling the language of commonality attributed to love in The Cloud o f 
Unlmowing. ‘From this joint procession two things follow. First, God is common: He 
is every being and the whole existence of all things (“In him, tlnough him, and from 
him” [Rm. 11:36])’ (ibid.). This reaffirms the major themes developed in the 
preceding pages (and in the earlier section on ontology): if love if predicated as the 
divine attribute par excellence, God’s commonality is emphasised and the relationship 
between the members of the created world strengthened. Tlnough this all-inclusive 
‘joint procession’ of God-as-love an understanding of the divine essence as 
participatory and as creation as mutually interdependent is established. From these 
notions comes a reaffimied sense of the intercomiectedness of humanity, and thi'ough 
this -  and the allied notion in Eckhart’s corpus of the divine nature inherent in 
humanity -  a sense of justice can be developed that combines and reconciles both the 
divinisation tlnough hierarchy found in Pseudo-Dionysius and the radical 
abandomnent of self advocated by the Cloud-author. Through love’s communalising 
force, manlrind is raised towards God, God empties himself of his divinity for the sake 
of mankind, and the individual ego is sublated into the divine.
It is difficult to imagine even Derrida accusing the Eckliart revealed in the passage mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph o f an essential hyperessentiality, as he does most thinkers in the apophatic 
tradition.
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VIII. Simone Weil and J.M. Coetzee; Reading Justice
A posthumous collection of aphorisms and brief essays taken from the 
notebooks of Simone Weil form the volume Gravity and Grace; within its pages are 
found passages of extraordinary insight and clarity into the theological discussion at 
hand. Weil by no means intended to be a theologian -  despite her interest in 
Catholicism she remained unbaptised, at the margins of the Church thi'oughout her 
life. Nevertheless, her writings bear significant import and reveal a mind capable of 
applying the lessons of the mystic tradition to the social conditions of the twentieth 
century; recent decades have seen a tremendous interest in her work, bringing her 
within the fold of more mainstream theologians. Her writings, many written in the 
midst of the Second World War, are filled with deep concern for the meaning of 
justice in a society wracked by the tumult of confict. South African novelist J.M. 
Coetzee’s Waiting fo r the Barbarians, discussed briefly above, is likewise infused 
with an acute perception of what justice might mean today, with particular references 
to the injustices created by imperialism. These two writers, coming from extremely 
different backgrounds and with massively divergent aims, nevertheless both present a 
formulation of justice centred on reading; the process of reading as such is refigured 
in these texts as a fonn of practicing justice. It is in this sense that a poetics of justice 
can be realised in Coetzee’s parable: through its elusive search for virtue in an 
unnamed land, his text schools the reader in a kenotic form of reading.
Simone Weil is straightforward in her analysis of the importance of reading to 
justice. In a section the editor entitles ‘Readings,’ Weil writes: ‘Justice. To be ever 
ready to admit that another person is something quite different from what we read 
when he is there (or when we think about him). Or rather, to read in him that he is 
certainly something different, perhaps something completely different, from what we 
read in him. Every being cries out to be read differently’ (134-5). Here, Weil’s central 
concern is an exegetical openness; the necessity of reading others tlnough an 
infinitely incomplete and corrective process is highlighted in this passage. Justice 
itself is equated with a process of reading that is always open to negotiation and 
correction; Weil makes the urgency of this need clear. If for Pseudo-Dionysius justice 
entails a progressive participation in hierarchy, Weil completes the thought by 
recognizing that progression will inevitably involve a constant evolution that must be 
accounted for tlirough ongoing adjustment of our estimation of others and our 
relationship to and involvement in the world and our communities -  and the texts that
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form a constituent part of all these th in g s .T h is  sense of a continuous and ongoing 
change emphasises the necessary fluidity of the implementation of justice in the world 
and recognises the danger inlierent in seeing history as a closed or teleological 
process.
Particularly critical in this project is that she assigns this conceptual process to 
reading: just as for Derrida textuality -  and its subsequent deconstructability -  is the 
implicit site of justice, so too does Weil extend the import of reading to social 
relations and assigns it a central role in the deployment of justice. ‘We read, but also 
we are read by, others. Interferences in these readings. Forcing someone to read 
himself as we read him (slavery). Forcing others to read us as we read ourselves 
(conquest). A mechanical process. More often than not a dialogue between deaf 
people’ (135). In this display of brittle misreadings and misrepresentations, Weil 
highlights the social implications of this process of reading and inteipretation; she 
makes evident the consequences of the bmtal misreadings that have plagued so much 
of modem history.
She is clear, however, on the frequently unintentional aspect of injustice: 
rarely is there an insidious desire to sin against justice, rather an inlierited set of 
paradigms, vocabularies -  in sum, readings -  that prevent one society or individual 
from just interaction with another. ‘We can be unjust through the will to offend justice 
or through a wrong reading of justice -  but the second is nearly always the case’ 
(ibid.). It is not through outright malice that injustice is most often committed, but 
rather through conflicting readings of justice or conflicted beliefs in how justice is 
best to be achieved. The troublesome and ever-eliisive remedy, then, must be found in 
the source of the problem itself: reading. Poetry and literature have as much to do 
with the creation of a just society as philosophy and theology; without the ability to 
properly read the Other, justice towards the Other is impossible. The development of 
open vocabularies and fluid narratives thus becomes the task for a specifically poetic
André Brink points to the necessity for this progressively-oriented system o f justice tlirough the 
bleak lens o f Apartheid South Africa in his compelling novel Looking on Darkness. A  conversation 
between the narrator and his lover provides a concrete discussion o f  the importance o f  openness to 
change and improvement touched upon above. ‘ “And one day. . . ?’ she whispered. “Do you think 
w e’ll ever arrive at a world o f peace, a world without violence, a world o f dignity?” “N o,” I said. “For I 
can’t believe in Utopia. It’s impossible for this world ever to become wholly good or wholly beautiful. 
But it can always be made a little better than it is. And if  I don’t fight to keep that small possibility 
open, everything will be smothered in blood’” (291).
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notion of justice, as opposed to more rigid formulaic or theoretical applications of the 
principle.
Weil herself seems to recognize the difficulty in determining which reading of 
justice ought to predominate. ‘What is the difference between the just and the unjust if 
all invariably act according to the justice they read?’ (135). Both groups have in mind 
an idealised justice, a set programme that they wish to implement in the world. If all 
govern their actions tlirough a particular reading of justice, how can we properly 
condemn those whose readings of justice undeniably lead to brutality and destruction? 
What are the criteria to be used in determining a just and an unjust reading of the 
world? Weil adds, fearfully, ‘[wjhat love of justice is a guarantee against a bad 
reading?’ (ibid.). It seems as though a bifurcation must be made between legitimate 
and illegitimate readings of justice; the greater difficulty, however, lies in 
safeguarding against this split itself and assuring that it does not become totalising or 
wrongly exclusive.
The solution Weil proposes is found in mysticism. She writes that ‘mysticism 
is the only source of virtue for humanity. Because when men do not believe that there 
is infinite mercy behind the curtain of the world, or when they think that this mercy is 
in fl'ont of the curtain, they become cruel’ (110-11). Mysticism, by preserving the 
memory of divine mercy that exceeds and transcends the world, promotes human 
virtue by reminding us of the incompleteness of our knowledge and of any consequent 
attempt to direct the course of history definitively or absolutely. Mysticism forces us 
to focus on the gaps in our understanding; it recalls to us the importance of the 
transcendence of the wholly other. This line of reasoning relates back to my earlier 
discussion of the implications of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics -  an entirely 
worldly conception of justice will inevitably result in an attempt to implement the 
concept or theory of that justice over and above the rights o f individuals. The belief 
that ultimate goodness is reachable in this world leads inevitably to an attempt to 
make that goodness manifest -  whatever the cost. That is to say, totalitarianism is the 
ultimate end of the cmelty that Weil sees as an inexorable result of disbelieving in an 
infinite mercy beyond this world. Her discussion also recalls Dem da’s insistence that 
justice must be always a-venir, that being yet-to-come or at hand is an irreplaceable 
component of justice. Mysticism of whatever denomination, in this light, preseiwes an 
ontological opening onto the impossible mercy -  and, thus, justice -  that must 
necessarily exceed this world.
64
In another passage in Gravity and Grace Simone Weil focuses on the 
crucifixion in its uninterpretability as the essential moment of justice. ‘To be just it is 
necessary to be naked and dead -  without imagination. That is why the model of 
justice has to be naked and dead. The cross alone is not open to imaginary imitation’ 
(87-8). Weil here presses foiward the notion that the imitation of Christ is not to be 
used merely as a rhetorical tool on the path to justice, another metaphor among many 
to be considered. Rather, she asserts that the justice of the cross is one immune to 
imaginary repetition, and instead provides the greatest gulf separating humanity from 
God’s justice. Emptying oneself completely, she proposes the most radical form of 
kenosis yet encountered. In essence, she takes to its conclusion the kenotic argument 
developed in Pseudo-Dionysius: in order to be just, to read justly, or to read justice 
justly, the reader must undergo a self-emptying which mirrors that of Cluist. This is 
the tiue assumption of divinity, the aporetic divinisation towards justice discussed 
earlier deployed in starkly resolute teims.
The imitation of Christ for Weil does not have the standard, quotidian sense of 
acting in a generous, self-sacrificing mamier to others as we imagine Christ might 
choose to do. Rather, it entails a very literal, unimaginative transformation into 
Christ’s moment of supreme kenosis on the cross. Just as, paradoxically, the greatest 
leap linguistically is into silence, so too does Weil propose the greatest imaginative 
leap possible into an unimaginative imitatio Christi. She writes, ‘I have to be like 
God, but like God crucified. Like God almighty in so far as he is bound by necessity’ 
(89). Divinisation here is not a gesture of supreme self-exaltation, but rather a 
moment of deepest kenosis. The imitatio Christi is refigured as an aporetic path to 
justice; the abandomnent of self advocated by the Cloud-author and the divinisation 
through hierarchy found in Pseudo-Dionysius find a synthesis in this movement. One 
must abandon oneself, empty oneself wholly, Weil asserts, in order to avoid the risk 
of reading justice in properly; the acknowledgement of the transcendent and the 
reminder of human incompleteness that mysticism offer a panacea to the cruelty of 
misreading.
Coetzee’s novel Waiting fo r  the Barbarians raises, under the same rubric of 
reading justice and the concomitant cruelties of misreading, a different set of 
questions. Although in a foimat markedly different from Weil’s philosophical and 
theological musings (which often border on the aphoristic). Waiting fo r  the 
Barbarians nevertheless shows a similar concern for the possibilities of a just reading
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(although it focuses far more on the cruelties that proceed from imperial misreading). 
The process of reading the parable per se -  set in the outskirts of a dystopic, never 
named empire -  becomes a hermeneutical exercise that provides a rich foundation for 
the flourishing of justice. That is to say, tlnough the process of reading the novel, the 
reader is schooled in a recognition of the ambiguities of power relations and justice. 
The lack of clear-cut moral high ground seiwes to highlight the difficulties in an 
unending model of justice as unfinished journey and unending hermeneutical process; 
the graphic representations of the Empire’s unthinking, fonnulaic violence and cruelty 
makes the reader similarly aware of the disadvantages of rigid, centralised, 
unresponsive misreadings of justice.
The narrator is an unnamed magistrate of a small, untroubled colonial outpost. 
Colonel Joll, a member of the imperial government’s military-intelligence division, 
comes to the outpost in order to ascertain the risk of a ‘barbarian’ attack against the 
Empire. The nomadic people that live outside the borders of ‘civilisation’ pose no real 
tlireat to the Empire; nevertheless, the Colonel is convinced that his application of 
torturous inten ogation of barbarian prisoners will yield tmth of the supposed 
impending attack. The narrator, far from an admirable character in many respects, 
nevertheless resists the Colonel’s depraved campaign, albeit in a muted and often 
misguided manner. The magistrate himself acknowledges his ambiguous moral 
standing: ‘I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving opposite of the 
cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire tells itself when times are easy, he the 
truth that Empire tells when harsh winds blow. Two sides of hnperial mle, no more, 
no less’ (148). His lenient -  not to say lax -  mle of the border town was not that of an 
enlightened despot or a representation of imperial goodwill, rather a mere luxury of 
inconsistency or inconfonnity, allowable because of its relative unimportance at the 
time.
Particularly useful, however, are the tropes of the reading of justice that come 
up in the tale. The novel begins, in fact, with the hint that the Colonel’s reading might 
be impaired: ‘I have never seen anything like it: two little discs of glass suspended in 
front of his eyes in loops of wire. Is he blind? I could understand it if  he wanted to 
hide blind eyes. But he is not blind. The discs are dark, they look opaque from the 
outside, but he can see tlirough them’ (1). Throughout the novel, even when indoors 
and vision becomes difficult, the Colonel is sure to keep his sunglasses on, shielding 
him from the sun and delineating him fr om the provincials. The novel opens, then.
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with a doubled obscurity: the Colonel’s darkened lenses obscuring his eyesight, and 
the narrator’s own difficulty in reading what these strange objects could possibly be. 
Later on, after the magistrate’s imprisonment for ‘treasonously consorting with the 
enemy’ (85), the Colonel’s inteiTogation of him includes an exercise in reading.
One of the magistrate’s hobbies as he idled his years away in the outpost of 
Empire was to collect archaeological remnants of the previous civilisation, including 
wooden slips on which obscure and incomprehensible characters were written in an 
ancient and lost tongue. In the Colonel’s hands, these become probable evidence of 
coded messages between the magistrate and ‘the enemy.’ Asked to translate their 
‘coded message,’ the magistrate pretends that they bear records of the various tortures 
the Colonel and his men have peipetrated on their prisoners. Eventually, he reads the 
final slip. ‘Now let us see what the next one says. See, there is only a single character. 
It is the barbarian character war, but it has other senses too. It can stand for 
vengeance, and, if  you turn it upside down like this, it can be made to read justice. 
There is no knowing which sense is intended. That is part of barbarian cunning’ (122). 
Here, an invented reading of a dead language has justice figured merely as war 
inverted; the magistrate emphasises the necessary ambiguity of this (fictionalised, 
invented) language. This episode functions as a microcosm of this particular theme of 
the novel: the magistrate’s reading is ambiguous and uncertain, but necessarily so.
The parable offers a reading exercise in recognising the injustices that spring from an 
over-certain reading; the magistrate here offers a picture of the need for an uncertain, 
shifting relationship to the text (and the Other as text).
He continues reporting to the Colonel during his intenogation to say that the 
set of slips ‘form an allegory. They can be read in many orders’ (ibid.), each one 
telling a different allegorical tale. These stories of dead civilisations can be found 
everywhere, he claims, even ‘the air . . .  if  you listen carefully, with a sympathetic ear, 
you can hear them echoing forever within the second sphere. The night is best: 
sometimes when you have difficulty falling asleep it is because your ears have been 
reached by the cries of the dead which, like their writings, are open to many 
inteipretations’ (123). The multiplicity of stories -  and allegorical interpretations of 
those stories -  breeds a polyglossic rendering of the need for an open and constantly 
readjusting inteipretive structure. Reading stretches beyond the text in his exposition; 
despite his confrontation with Colonel Joll he maintains this provoking insistence on
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the ambiguity of language and the necessity to be open to rereading and reinterpreting 
texts -  and impossibility of coming to justice otheiwise.
In a similarly defiant meeting with one of the guards that alternately feeds and 
tortures him, the magistrate completes the thought only half-implied in the previous 
passage. ‘Forgive me if the question seems impudent, but I would like to ask: How do 
you find it possible to eat afterwards, after you have been . . . working with people? . . 
. Do you find it easy to take food afteiwards? I have imagined that one would want to 
wash one’s hands. But no ordinary washing would be enough, one would require 
priestly intervention, a ceremonial cleansing, don’t you thinlc?’ (138). The 
magistrate’s bewilderment as to the practical, physical repercussions of torture move 
towards a realisation of the profound pollution wrought by such injustice. He 
continues: ‘[d]o not misunderstand me, I am not blaming you or accusing you, I am 
long past that. Remember, I too have devoted a life to the law, I know its processes, I 
know that the workings o f justice are often obscure . . .  I am trying to imagine how 
you breathe and eat and live from day to day. But I camiot! That is what troubles me! 
If I were he, I say to myself, my hands would feel so dirty that it would choke me -  ‘ 
(ibid.). It is not any sort o f profound metaphysical argument against injustice the 
magistrate here proposes, but simply a bewildered fascination with the possibility that 
this man, too, could sit down and eat a meal, sequestering away his barbarous daily 
activities. Mandel has no answer, no justification to offer. He bashes the magistrate in 
the chest “ ‘You bastard!” he shouts. “You fucking old lunatic! Get out! Go and die 
somewhere!”’ (ibid.).
What these two tremendously different writers -  Simone Weil and J.M. 
Coetzee -  working in entirely different genres have to offer to the discussion at hand 
is a common geography of justice.^^ In the same way that Denida and Pseudo- 
Dionysius might be profitably or meaningfully compared, so too do these contribute 
to a geography, a map on which we might plot our progress on the aporetic journey 
towards justice. Whether figured as Neoplatonic procession and ascent, Derridean 
aporia or, as here, a special kind of reading, the common gi'ound is that they all play a
The sketch o f Mount Carmel drawn by St Jolm o f the Cross (still extant, and incorporated movingly 
into T.S. Eliot’s ‘East Coker’) provides a fascinating example o f an aporetic geography o f justice. At 
the top o f  the page lies the inscription ‘Mount Carmel’; immediately underneath is the legend ‘[hjere 
there is no longer any way because for the just man there is no law, he is a law unto h im self (110-111). 
For a provocative use o f  St John o f  the Cross in contemporary South African fiction, see André Brink’s 
novel (banned for many years in the author’s native South Africa) Looking on Darkness (London: 
Vintage, 1993).
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role in mapping out this common geography/'^ An essential feature to note in these 
occun*ences is their emphasis on our own incomplete implementation of justice: 
mystics, theorists, and novelists all point to the gaps in our knowledge, the breaks or 
faults in our relationship to our participation injustice. In all events the map of our 
progress is one in which the final destination, the end of the journey, is always 
necessarily hidden. As Weil writes, ‘[ejvery being cries out silently to be read 
differently’ (135): our reading of others and of justice must constantly be examining 
their own incompleteness and revising their decisions.
Significantly, Waiting fo r the Barbarians ends with the magistrate witnessing 
a group of children at play and acknowledging: ‘[l]ike much else nowadays I leave it 
feeling stupid, like a man who lost his way ages ago but presses on along a road that 
may lead nowhere’ (170). At the end of the parable the magistrate, broken and 
rehabilitated, seeing Colonel foil’s campaign against the barbarians utterly collapse, 
glumly accepts the journey ahead of him. Pressing onward towards a perhaps 
umeachable goal, he admits his own incapacities and nevertheless perseveres. These 
incapacities, however -  an understanding of self-limitations in the pursuit of justice, a 
belief in the ultimately ungi'aspable nature of the destination to be achieved -  instead 
strengthen the discourse of justice as developed thus far in this project. The benefit of 
the recognition that justice is a journey -  or perhaps a pilgrimage -  for which the goal 
must always ever he hidden is a specific reassessment of focus. The process of search 
itself replaces the goal of our searching.^^ Instead of concentrating on concepts such 
as the ‘being’ of God or the ‘essence’ of justice, we might focus our energies more 
beneficially on the process of creating justice in this world -  on creating proper 
readings of justice, of ourselves, and of others. Through the proper recognition that 
reaching the transcendent and facing the aporetic are necessary impossibilities on the
Michel de Certeau's insightful text The Practice o f  Eveiyday Life (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1984) develops the concept o f  geography as itself a text. De Certeau dr aws on the textual 
components o f geography and movement tlirough space -  specifically, the everyday practice of 
walking tlnough a city -  and writes about, in essence, the rhetoric o f walking. He describes ‘a 
homology between verbal figures and the figures o f  walking (a stylized selection among the latter is 
already found in the figures o f  dancing) insofar as both consist in “heatments” or operations bearing on 
isolatable units, and in “ambiguous dispositions” that divert and displace meaning in the direction o f  
equivocalness in the way a tremulous image confuses and multiplies the photographed object’ (100). 
This comparison between place and text is particularly useful in the context developed here o f a 
‘geography’ o f  justice that is dependent upon textuality.
Jabès writes evocatively on the specifically literaiy  aspect o f this incompleteness: ‘[f]rom death to 
death, from silence to silence, a book is a milestone, never the end’ (182).
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path to justice, consequent attention can be paid to the specific demands of justice in 
this world.
IX. Conclusion
Through the various texts I have analysed over the course of this essay, certain 
themes have become clear. The relationship between mystical theology and justice 
that I sought to establish through various discourses consists, in the final analysis, 
primarily in the awareness of the incompleteness and openness of our own knowledge 
(via aporia) and the ability to school the reader of a mystic text in a form of imitative 
self-emptying and concordant minimisation of the ego (via kenosis). These dual 
motions of mysticism allow a sense o f justice to emerge that is governed not by 
steadfast and immovable principles that demand unthinking and umeflective devotion, 
but rather an understanding of justice as an ever-evolving and unfinished process that 
must be always self-examining and se lf  correcting.
This approach, however, is not without its own difficulties. Questions of 
ecclesiastical and temporal authority undoubtedly still linger. Although limitations of 
space preclude a fuller consideration of how mysticism and the power structures of 
the Church Universal (in all its hypostases) might be incorporated in a maimer 
beneficial to both, suffice it to say here that the challenges posed by such an encounter 
are not insumiountable and the rewards to be reaped considerable. It is difficult, to say 
the least, to build a cathedral atop a cloud of unknowing -  and yet the possible 
outcome of a coherent dialogue between mysticism and the Church^® seems 
immensely rich in potential benefits for religious life in contemporary society.
Christ’s foundation of the Church’s temporal authority in Matthew 16:18-19 
(‘you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church’) seems a cmshing voice in 
support of a rigidly institutionalised Church, yet the next verse presents Christ’s voice 
demanding silence (‘he warned his disciples not to tell anyone that he was the 
Christ’), hi the space of this silence the voice of mysticism might be heard, offering a 
counteipart and a complement to the established power of the Church. Mysticism’s 
voice warns the Church, constantly reminding it that it must always remain a mere
Michel de Certeau writes o f  the necessary difficulty that mystics must have vis-à-vis the Church. 
‘Although they put themselves in a different position from that o f the Church instruction ex cathedra, 
they claim nonetheless to bear witness to the same God. They have to prove, at one and the same time, 
that they speak from a different place (as “mystics”) and that they draw on the same inspiration (as 
“Cliristians”) . . . The spring born by surprise in the basement must bear the same Name as the house 
beneath which it appeared’ (1992, 181).
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simulacrum of its authorisation and its goal; mysticism reminds the Church that its 
knowledge and its authority are ever provisional and incomplete, Thi'ough this 
awareness, authority would be tempered by an awareness of its own limits and of the 
need to responsibly be prepared to alter one’s readings of a person or a situation, 
hiformed by its mystic tradition, the Church might adopt a constant openness towards 
re-readings and readjustments, a recognition of the lacunæ in its knowledge, and a 
kenotic understanding of both the individual and the text. Tlnough this, the Church 
might truly be able to make manifest the ‘wisdom that is from above’ which is ‘first 
pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, 
without partiality.’ For ‘the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace of them that make 
peace’ (Jas. 3:17-18, AV).
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